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Research Report
The UN Security Council and Climate Change
Introduction 
At the outset of the Security Council’s 23 Feb-
ruary 2021 open debate on climate and security, 
world-renowned naturalist David Attenborough 
delivered a video message urging global coopera-
tion to tackle the climate crisis. “If we continue on 
our current path, we will face the collapse of every-
thing that gives us our security—food production; 
access to fresh water; habitable, ambient tempera-
tures; and ocean food chains”, he said. Later, he 
added, “Please make no mistake. Climate change 
is the biggest threat to security that humans have 
ever faced.” Such warnings have become common. 
And while the magnitude of this challenge is widely 
accepted, it is not clear if the global community, in 
particular the major carbon-emitting states, will 
show the level of commitment needed to reduce 
carbon emissions enough to stave off the more dire 
predictions of climate modellers. 
While climate mitigation and adaptation 
measures are within the purview of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and contributions to such measures 
are outlined in the Paris Agreement, many Secu-
rity Council members view climate change as a 
security threat worthy of the Council’s attention. 
Other members do not. One of the difficulties in 
considering whether or not the Council should 
play a role (and a theme of this report) is that 
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there are different interpretations of what is 
appropriate for the Security Council to do 
in discharging its Charter-given mandate to 
maintain international peace and security. 
Notwithstanding these tensions, the issue 
has gained traction in the Council in recent 
years. An increasing number of Council mem-
bers are choosing to hold signature events on cli-
mate change and security, during their monthly 
Council presidencies, to support the integration 
of climate change language into formal Council 
outcomes (that is, resolutions and presidential 
statements), and more broadly, to approach 
peace and security issues with greater sensitiv-
ity to the harmful effects of climate change.   
In open debates and Arria-formula meet-
ings, Council members and other member 
states have also increasingly framed this risk 
in more holistic terms, linking climate change 
and security to other thematic issues on the 
Council’s agenda. For example, they often dis-
cuss the impacts of climate change on women 
and youth—and the role that these groups can 
play in responding to climate-security risks—
and they explore how climate change, pan-
demics, hunger, and conflict interact to com-
pound security risks in conflict-affected and 
other vulnerable settings. Council members 
have often seen efforts to tackle climate-secu-
rity threats as an element of the UN system’s 
conflict prevention work, and in more recent 
years, many of them have also viewed address-
ing climate change as an important part of the 
UN’s peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sus-
taining peace efforts.
A further focus of this report is the signifi-
cant institutional architecture that has been 
established just since 2018, both within and 
outside the UN system, to help undergird the 
efforts of the Security Council and the broad-
er UN family on this issue. This has includ-
ed the establishment of an Informal Expert 
Group of Members of the Security Council on 
Climate and Security and a Group of Friends 
on Climate and Security, among other initia-
tives. These developments have largely reflect-
ed the initiative of Council members and other 
member states to foster a better understand-
ing of climate-security risks and consistent 
and meaningful responses to them.
Efforts within UN peace operations to 
develop responses to climate-related secu-
rity threats continue to make progress, but 
are uneven and lack sufficient resources. The 
Council can enhance its focus on climate-
related security matters, but in order for cli-
mate risks to be assuaged in relevant situa-
tions on the Council’s agenda, the rest of the 
UN system will need to continue to build its 
capacity and expertise on this issue. 
The report explores the above-mentioned 
themes in the following sections:
• The first section briefly analyses whether 
the Council is an appropriate venue to 
address climate-security matters. 
• The second section looks to the UN 
Charter and Security Council and Gen-
eral Assembly practice for guidance on 
Council involvement on climate change 
and security matters. 
• The third section outlines the ways in 
which the Council has engaged on this 
issue in meetings and in formal outcomes. 
It also describes the institutional mecha-
nisms that have been established to help 
the Council and the UN more broadly to 
address climate-related security threats in 
a more consistent and impactful manner.  
• The fourth section discusses Security Coun-
cil dynamics on climate change and security.
• The fifth section offers some observations 
on the Council’s approach to climate and 
security matters and presents options for 
the way forward. 
The report concludes with annexes sum-
marising climate change language in Secu-
rity Council outcomes, and listing other rel-
evant documents.
The Climate-Security Conundrum   
The Council is the UN organ conferred 
under Article 24 of the UN Charter with the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. Address-
ing the challenges of climate change does not 
fit neatly into conventional notions of peace 
and security, which tend to focus narrowly 
on the absence of violent conflict. Moreover, 
the Council must make choices about effec-
tive time and resource allocation. Its agenda 
is already packed with crises featuring more 
evidently direct drivers of insecurity: some 
question how much time the Council should 
accord to climate and security matters, when 
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faced with more immediate threats to peace and security in particu-
lar situations. 
The best way to avert the worst security impacts of climate 
change lies in significantly reducing global carbon emissions. As 
the UNFCCC is the primary vehicle through which such efforts 
are pursued, no one would reasonably expect the Security Coun-
cil to play a key role in this regard. It is similarly highly unlikely 
that the Council would sanction those countries most responsible 
for carbon emissions, especially as some of the body’s permanent 
members are among the world’s biggest emitters and would resist 
sanctioning themselves.1 
As well, the relationship between climate change and conflict com-
plex and not well understood. In one article based on interviews with 
12 leading social scientists, the authors conclude that low socioeco-
nomic development, low state capacity, intergroup inequality, and 
a past history of conflict are most associated with conflict risk and 
that “climate variability and/or change is low on the ranked list of 
most influential conflict drivers across experience to date”.2  There 
are “notable uncertainties about climate-conflict links”, and there 
is “limited understanding” of these connections, “whether through 
agriculture, economic shocks, disasters or migration”.3  In addition, 
although climate change may be one of many factors leading to or 
exacerbating conflict, it can be a challenge to pinpoint its exact role 
or the relative strength of its impact; this conceptual murkiness, in 
turn, makes it difficult to offer effective policy prescriptions4 —pre-
senting a dilemma for an organ such as the UN Security Council 
in identifying concrete measures to tackle the security implications 
of climate change. As Conca has written, “While conflict modelers 
agree on the importance of several contextual factors, there is no 
single, consensual ‘base model’ to which climate-related factors may 
simply be added.”5 
Despite these conceptual difficulties, there are persuasive argu-
ments to support the Security Council’s engagement on climate 
change and security. While Sakaguchi et al. question the extent of 
the climate change-security connection, they nonetheless note that 
“62.3 percent of the studies [in their analysis] find evidence that cli-
mate change variables are associated with higher levels of conflict.”6 
They add that more work is needed on understanding the role of 
climate change in causal mechanisms related to conflict;7 an argu-
ment for more research on this relationship, rather than a dismissal 
1. Binder, Martin, and Monika Heupel. 2018. “Contested Legitimacy: The UN Security Council and Climate Change.” In Climate Change and the UN Security Council, by Charlotte Ku and Shirley V. Scott, 
186-208. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.191-192. Binder and Heupel similarly note “…while the Council has the legal authority to authorize the use of force against states whose failure 
to substantially reduce their C0₂ emissions it deems to constitute a threat to peace and security, such a step is still no plausible scenario given that three of the five permanent Council members 
(P5) – the United States, China and Russia – are among the world’s largest emitters”. 
2. Mach, Katharine J., Caroline M. Kraan, W. Neil Adger, Halvard Buhaug, Marshall Burke, James D. Fearon, Christopher B. Field et al. “Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict.” Nature 571, no. 7764 
(2019): 193-197, p.4.
3. Mach, Katharine J., and Caroline M. Kraan. “Science–policy dimensions of research on climate change and conflict.” Journal of Peace Research (2021): 0022343320966774. p.169.
4. Sakaguchi, Kendra, Anil Varughese, and Graeme Auld. “Climate wars? A systematic review of empirical analyses on the links between climate change and violent conflict.” International Studies 
Review 19, no. 4 (2017): 622-645, p.641.
5. Conca, Ken. “Is there a role for the UN Security Council on climate change?.” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 61, no. 1 (2019): 4-15, p.7.
6. Sakaguchi, Kendra, Anil Varughese, and Graeme Auld. “Climate wars? A systematic review of empirical analyses on the links between climate change and violent conflict.” International Studies 
Review 19, no. 4 (2017): 622-645, p.640.
7. Ibid, 624.
8. von Uexkull, Nina, and Halvard Buhaug. “Security implications of climate change: a decade of scientific progress.” (2021): 3-17, p.6.
9. Adrien Detges, Daniel Klingenfeld, Christian König, Benjamin Pohl, Lukas Rüttinger, Jacob Schewe, Barbora Sedova, and Janani Vivekananda,. 2020. 10 Insights on Climate Impacts and Peace: A 




12. United Nations. 2020. “Climate Security Mechanism, Toolbox, Briefing Note.” https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/csm_toolbox-1-briefing_note.pdf, p.4.
13. International Crisis Group. 2021. How Climate Science Can Help Conflict Prevention. April 20. https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/how-climate-science-can-help-conflict-prevention. 
of such a connection. In this regard, in a recent article assessing the 
literature over the past decade on the relationship between climate 
change and security, the authors note, “more than half of the review 
studies considered here have called for more research that explicitly 
investigates pathways and intermediate factors”.8 
Furthermore, there is wide agreement that climate change is 
a risk multiplier.9 In a report jointly issued by two leading think 
tanks on climate policy, the authors observe that, among its negative 
effects, climate change can “increase resource demands, environ-
mental degradation and uneven development, and exacerbate exist-
ing fragility and conflict risks”.10 They further note that while climate 
change is “rarely a direct cause of conflict…there is ample evidence 
that its effects exacerbate important drivers and contextual factors 
of conflict and fragility, thereby challenging the stability of states and 
societies”.11  With mitigation efforts to date failing to curb global 
warming, it is also clear that climate change will become a greater 
risk factor for conflict in the future.12 As its security implications 
become more grave, the Council may increasingly be compelled 
to address the climate crisis. In the meantime, the Council has a 
Charter-mandated conflict prevention role that supports addressing 
climate risks before they deteriorate into violence.
In addition, implementing the risks assessments and risk manage-
ment strategies that the Council has encouraged in various settings 
can play a meaningful security role. As the International Crisis Group 
has argued, “while climate change itself does not cause conflict per se, 
resource governance—how people in power manage access to land, 
water and other parts of nature’s bounty amid climate change—can 
increase or reduce the risk of violence”.13 Examples of risk man-
agement strategies could include working with host governments 
and other local actors to develop transhumance routes that limit the 
potential for conflict between communities or mediating between 
different groups contesting dwindling resources.
Nonetheless, the Council is still searching for how it can most 
effectively address the adverse effects of climate change, and how its 
efforts relate to those of the constellation of actors within and out-
side the UN system working towards the same goal. As the Council 
grapples with the most appropriate role to play on climate change 
and security, it is important to underscore that the Council’s voice 
matters, especially on an issue of such global importance. For all its 
faults, the Security Council is the most powerful and perhaps the 
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most recognisable part of an international institution that still com-
mands a high level of respect across the globe.14 The Security Council 
may not have all or even many of the answers to the security effects 
14. Fagan, Moira, and Christine Huang. 2019. United Nations Gets Mostly Positive Marks from People Around the World. September 23. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/23/united-
nations-gets-mostly-positive-marks-from-people-around-the-world/A 2019 Pew Research Center Poll found that: “Across 32 surveyed countries [in various regions], a median of 61% have a positive 
view of the UN, while a median of just 26% have a negative view.”.
15. Penny, Christopher K. 2018. “Climate Change as a ‘Threat to International Peace and Security’.” In Climate Change and the UN Security Council, by Charlotte Ku and Shirley V. Scott, 25-46. 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, p.34. Penny has likewise observed, “The Charter itself does not define ‘threat to international peace and security’ (or, to be more precise, ‘threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of agression’). Instead, the meaning of this concept has developed through actual organizational practice.”
16. Luck, Edward, C. 2014. “Change and the United Nations Charter.” In Charter of the United Nations Together with Scholarly Commentaries and Essential Historical Documents, by Ian Shapiro and 
Joseph Lampert, 121-142. New Haven: Yale University Press, p.129.
of climate change, but it can be expected to galvanise awareness of 
and international responses to a crisis whose threat to international 
peace and security will likely continue to grow.
The UN Charter and Security Council Practice
The UN Charter is the starting point for assessing whether the Secu-
rity Council can play a role on climate change and security. The UN’s 
founders did not foresee the threat of climate change, but there are 
clues both in the Charter and in Council practice that might help 
address important questions that are frequently raised. 
Is the Council overstepping its authority by delving into an 
issue that may often only have tangential links to conflict?
It is the Council’s prerogative to decide what matters it should 
address. Member states and the Secretariat can refer situations 
and disputes to the Council, but the Council itself is the ultimate 
arbiter of its own work. The precise nature of “international peace 
and security” in Article 24 (1) is not specified, and it is up to the 
Council to determine what this entails.15 The lack of a clear defi-
nition of “peace and security” in the Charter may be one reason 
why determining what issues fit appropriately within the Council’s 
mandate is so hotly contested. 
The Security Council’s efforts to combat climate change are 
often cast in terms of its conflict prevention work—a need to 
understand and respond to a severe environmental challenge that 
can exacerbate the risk of conflict. In this regard, the Charter is 
replete with conflict prevention language, beginning with the pre-
amble, whose opening lines highlight the determination of the 
United Nations “to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war”. Article 34 of Chapter VI on “Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes” is particularly relevant, as it states:
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situ-
ation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute 
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
The terms “situation” and “dispute” are broad enough to include 
a wide range of phenomena. Climate change could reasonably be 
among these, even if one were to consider it as primarily a sustain-
able development issue. As Luck has argued: “Article 34’s references 
to ‘disputes’ and ‘situations’ undoubtedly encompassed economic 
and trade issues, as well as social and human rights matters”, adding 
that a “number of delegations at San Francisco [where the Charter 
was drafted] emphasised the economic and social roots of conflict”.16 
The trajectory of Security Council practice also reflects prece-
dents for this organ to have a role on climate change and security 
matters. Since the end of the Cold War, the Council has broadened 
the array of issues that it addresses. This broader perspective is con-
sistent with the view that threats to “human security”—defined by 
General Assembly resolution 66/290 as an “approach to assist Mem-
ber States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting 
challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people”—
not only heighten the risk of conflict but also undermine efforts to 
sustain peace and stability in a long-term, durable way. In this respect, 
members continue to address various issues that reflect an expanded 
vision of the Council’s mandate and encompass human security con-
cerns, such as the protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, 
sexual violence in armed conflict, pandemics, and hunger and con-
flict. Human rights abuses—perceived by many Council members 
as a risk factor for conflict, as are other human security threats—are 
discussed in the Council’s work in country-specific situations, just as 
climate change is, although not without controversy. 
Is the Council infringing on the authority of other UN 
organs with more expertise in this area?
Based on the Charter, it appears that different organs should be able 
to simultaneously address an issue, such as climate change, which 
straddles the various pillars of the UN’s work (peace and securi-
ty, development and human rights). While the Charter lays out the 
responsibilities of the different organs of the UN system, it does not 
separate them into silos. The Charter links different parts of the UN 
system, suggesting that various UN organs and bodies were intended 
by the framers of the Charter to work together to address complex 
issues. For example, under Article 11 (3), the General Assembly 
“may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are 
likely to endanger international peace and security”, while ECOSOC 
“may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the 
Security Council upon its request”, according to Article 65. In prac-
tice, although the Council most frequently draws on the expertise 
and advice of the Secretariat, it also, on occasion, makes use of the 
input of the General Assembly, ECOSOC and other UN entities. In 
this regard, the ECOSOC president has briefed the Security Council 
on various occasions during the last two decades; the last such brief-
ing was in November 2020 during a high-level open videoconference 
session on “contemporary drivers of conflict and insecurity”, under 
the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace agenda, in a meeting that 
focused largely on the implications of climate change and COVID-19 
on peace and security.
While some member states emphasise that climate change is 
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primarily a sustainable development issue outside of the Council’s 
purview, those holding a less traditional view of peace and security 
might note that the Security Council—and the wider UN member-
ship—has explicitly emphasised the linkages between security and 
development on numerous occasions. In January 1992, at the dawn 
of the post-Cold War era, the Security Council met at the heads of 
state and government level for the first time in its history to discuss 
the agenda item: “The responsibility of the Security Council in the 
maintenance of international peace and security”.17 In the presiden-
tial statement adopted at the end of the meeting, the Council stat-
ed: “The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, 
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace 
and security.”18 In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the 
world’s heads of state and government reaffirmed their “commit-
ment to work towards a security consensus based on the recognition 
that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security 
and human rights are mutually reinforcing”.19 And more recently, 
in the April 2016 resolution adopted concurrently with the General 
Assembly on the UN peacebuilding architecture, the Security Coun-
cil affirmed that one of the roles of the Peacebuilding Commission 
is to: “promote an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to 
peacebuilding, noting that security, development and human rights 
are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing.”20 
These pronouncements about the linkages between peace and 
security, on the one hand, and development, on the other, would 
seem to suggest a role for the Security Council on climate change and 
security, working on the issue in conjunction with other UN entities. 
However, there is a caveat to this view. Security Council outcomes 
that emphasise the security-development nexus also at times refer to 
the distinct activities of various UN bodies, which can be perceived 
17. United Nations. 1992. Security Council 3046th meeting. January 31. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20SPV%20
3046.pdf. 
18. United Nations. 1992. Note by the President of the Security Council S/23500. January 31. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
PKO%20S%2023500.pdf.
19. United Nations. 2005. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome. September 16. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalas-
sembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf.
20. United Nations. 2016. Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016). April 27. https://undocs.org/S/RES/2282(2016), p.1.
21. Ibid, p.2.
22. Vivekananda, Janani, Day, Adam, and Susanne Wolfmaier. 2020. What can the UN Security Council do on Climate and Security? Berlin: Climate Security Expert Network. https://climate-security-
expert-network.org/sites/climate-security-expert-network.com/files/documents/what_can_the_un_security_council_do_on_climate_and_security_v2.pdf, p.10.
23. United Nations. 2009. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/281. June 3. https://undocs.org/A/RES/63/281, op.1.
24. United Nations. 2007. Security Council 5663rd meeting. April 17. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_5663.pdf
as a nod to the concerns about infringement on the prerogatives of 
other UN entities. For example, while resolution 2282 (the sustaining 
peace resolution of 27 April 2016) recognises the linkages between 
security and development, it also recognises that “an integrated and 
coherent approach among relevant political, security and develop-
ment actors, within and outside of the United Nations system, con-
sistent with their respective mandates [emphasis added], and the Charter 
of the United Nations, is critical to sustaining peace.”21 This implies 
an effort to distinguish between the roles of different UN entities, as 
those with a more conservative view of “international peace and secu-
rity” might point to the reference to “respective mandates” as a way 
of differentiating the Council’s work from that of other UN entities. 
General Assembly resolution 63/281(2009) on “Climate Change 
and its possible security implications” is another document open 
to interpretation as to whether the Council encroaches on the pre-
rogatives of other organs with respect to climate change, reflecting 
the tensions among the membership on this issue. In that resolu-
tion, the General Assembly recognises the different responsibilities 
of UN organs, maintaining that the Security Council is primarily 
responsible for peace and security and that the General Assembly 
and ECOSOC are responsible for sustainable development issues, 
including climate change.22 Read in isolation, this implies that the 
Council does not have a role with regard to climate change. However, 
the resolution also invites “the relevant organs of the United Nations, 
as appropriate and within their respective mandates, to intensify their 
efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its 
possible security implications” [emphasis added].23 This could be inter-
preted as envisioning a potential role for the Security Council, in light 
of the “possible security implications” of climate change. 
Security Council Engagement:  Evolution and Key Themes 
Despite the challenging road that the Council has travelled on cli-
mate and security matters since 2007, its engagement has persisted 
and accelerated significantly in the past few years.  Not only are more 
meetings being held on climate change and security as a thematic 
topic, but language on climate change and security is increasingly 
being included in Security Council outcomes.
Council Debates and Briefings on Climate Change and 
Security 
The Security Council has had several thematic debates on climate 
and security matters. The first time the Council focused explicitly 
on climate change as a thematic topic was on 17 April 2007 dur-
ing a ministerial-level open debate on the relationship between 
energy, security and climate, which was convened by the UK and 
included a briefing by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.24 Prior to 
the meeting, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group 
of 77 (G77) + China sent letters to the Security Council expressing 
concern about infringement on the work of the General Assembly 
and the Economic and Social Council. However, there have been 
fissures in the NAM and the G77 on this issue over the years, with 
several members from both groups supporting Council engage-
ment on climate change and security. 
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The Council again took up climate change on 20 July 2011, in 
an open debate initiated by Germany that featured a briefing by 
Secretary-General Ban and Achim Steiner, the Executive Director 
of the UN Environment Programme.25 It adopted a presidential 
statement, which was only finalised during the debate, after difficult 
negotiations.26 Early in the meeting, with the fate of the document 
still unclear, Ambassador Susan Rice (US) complained about the 
Council’s inability “to reach consensus on even a simple draft presi-
dential statement that climate change has the potential to impact 
peace and security in the face of the manifest evidence that it does”. 
Failure to reach agreement would be “pathetic” and “a dereliction 
of duty”, she added.
While modest in substance, the presidential statement marked 
the first and, by mid-2021, the Security Council’s only thematic 
product on climate change and security. It reaffirmed that the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change “is the key instrument 
for addressing climate change”. It expressed concern that possible 
adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate cer-
tain existing threats to international peace and security. And it noted 
the importance of including conflict analysis and contextual infor-
mation on the possible security implications of climate change in the 
Secretary-General’s reports, “when such issues are drivers of conflict, 
represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or 
endanger the process of consolidation of peace”. Implementation of 
this presidential statement was generally weak for many years, in part 
because of the lack of capacity of the Secretariat to follow through 
on this request, but action has picked up since the launch in 2018 of 
the Climate-Security Mechanism, a small team within the UN Sec-
retariat that strives to enhance the organisation’s capacity to respond 
to climate-related security risks.  
Since 2018, the Council has held five thematic meetings (four 
open debates and one debate) specifically focused on climate change 
and security. Since climate change is not a formal agenda item with a 
periodic reporting cycle, these thematic meetings have been held at 
the initiative of monthly Security Council presidents, who have con-
sidered the relationship between climate change and security impor-
tant enough to feature in discretionary events during their presi-
dencies.27 These were: a debate on “Understanding and addressing 
climate-related security risks” initiated by Sweden on 11 July 2018; 
an open debate on “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disas-
ter on international peace and security on 25 January 2019 convened 
by the Dominican Republic; an open debate on “climate and security” 
held on 24 July 2020 and initiated by Germany; an open debate on 
the “Humanitarian effects of environmental degradation and peace 
and security” on 17 September 2020 spearheaded by Niger; and an 
open debate on 23 February 2021 on “Addressing climate-related 
security risks to international peace and security through mitiga-
tion and resilience building” hosted by the United Kingdom. (The 
Council’s meetings on climate change and security, with the briefers 
for each, are listed in Annex I.)
25. United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting. July 20. https://undocs.org/S/PV.6587. Check also: United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting (Resumption). July 20. https://
undocs.org/S/PV.6587(Resumption%201).
26. United Nations. 2011. Statement by the President of the Security Council. July 20. https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2011/15
27. The UNSC monthly presidency rotates in accordance with the English language alphabet.
28. United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting (Resumption). July 20. https://undocs.org/S/PV.6587(Resumption%201), p.11, 25. Check also: United Nations. 2021. Security Council VTC 
meeting. February 25. https://undocs.org/S/2021/198, p.34.
29. United Nations. 2007. Security Council 5663rd meeting. April 17. https://undocs.org/S/PV.5663, p.24. Check also: United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting. July 20. https://undocs.
org/S/PV.6587, p.25-26. And check also: United Nations. 2019. Security Council 8451st meeting. January 25. https://undocs.org/S/PV.8451, p.64.
In the lead-up to the July 2020 open debate, Germany sought to 
pursue a thematic resolution on climate change and security. This 
initiative was carefully planned. During its campaign for a 2019-2020 
Council term, Germany made clear that climate change and security 
would be a priority; upon entering the Council, it was already con-
sidering the pursuit of a thematic outcome on this issue. It worked 
for several weeks with nine other members that supported the ini-
tiative to develop the text. These members—Belgium, the Domini-
can Republic, Estonia, France, Niger, St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines, Tunisia, UK, and Vietnam—were expected to co-sponsor the 
draft and joined Germany in an effort to garner support from the 
remaining Council members (China, Indonesia, South Africa, Russia, 
and the US). Among this latter group, the three permanent mem-
bers (China, Russia and the US) were the main targets of advocacy 
because of their power to veto the draft. 
The draft was ambitious. It invited the Secretary-General to con-
sider the security implications of the effects of climate change in a 
wide array of activities, ranging from conflict prevention to peace-
building support and humanitarian response. Among its more nota-
ble features, the draft requested the Secretary-General:
• to submit a report within six months of the adoption of the resolu-
tion (and every two years thereafter) on the security implications 
of the negative effects of climate change;
• to appoint a Special Representative who would be responsible for 
coordinating the UN’s efforts to address climate-related security 
threats, as well as for advocating for these efforts and exchanging 
information on climate-security threats within the UN system and 
with external actors; and 
• to identify Climate and Security Advisors to be deployed in rel-
evant field operations and have access to mission leadership.
The draft had to be shelved well before the 24 July open debate, 
however, because of the political climate. While China and Russia 
were not supportive of the initiative, the US expressed the strongest 
opposition. US Ambassador Kelly Craft reportedly indicated that the 
US mission was under orders from Washington to block a thematic 
outcome on climate and security.  
Common threads link the Council’s meetings on climate and 
security between April 2007 and February 2021. Member states with 
varying views on Council involvement on this issue have emphasised 
the importance of international efforts to curb carbon emissions and 
adapt to the impacts of climate change, although developing coun-
tries have tended to place the primary responsibility for mitigation on 
the developed world and to underscore the need to enhance support 
to developing countries for climate financing and technology trans-
fers.28 In these debates, opponents of a Council role on this issue have 
consistently voiced concerns about encroachment on the work of 
other UN entities that they believe are more competent to address cli-
mate change.29 Proponents of Council engagement have recognised 
the central role of the UNFCCC and other parts of the UN system 
in addressing climate change; nonetheless, they have maintained that 
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the Security Council has a responsibility to try to deal with climate-
related security effects. Rather than viewing the Security Council as 
a usurper of the authority of other UN organs, they believe that the 
different parts of the UN system, including the Security Council, 
need to work together to confront the security challenges of climate 
change. They have often referred to climate change as a “threat mul-
tiplier” that can exacerbate conflict risks and instability,30 although 
they recognise that climate change is usually not the primary driver of 
conflict. Another concern consistently raised in these meetings—by 
both those supportive of a Security Council role on climate-security 
matters and those against—is the threat that climate change poses to 
small island developing states because of rising sea levels.31 
At the same time that certain themes have recurred, the substance 
of the discussions has evolved over the years. Several but not all mem-
ber states have increasingly maintained that climate change should 
be more systematically integrated into the Council’s work. More 
and more, climate-related security threats are being linked to other 
thematic issues addressed by the Council, and described as a mat-
ter that should be tackled with holistic responses. In this regard, the 
disproportionate effects of climate change on women and youth and 
their role in addressing climate risks have become a greater focus of 
the recent debates on this issue, although there was already some dis-
cussion of the impact of climate change on women in the 2011 open 
debate.32 Member state interventions on these issues have empha-
sised the importance of female and youth participation in generating 
responses to the adverse effects of climate change.33 
In the open debates in 2020 and 2021, several Council members 
and other member states drew comparisons between climate change 
and COVID-19. Both were described as transnational threats whose 
interaction worsens the conditions of the vulnerable. As two phe-
nomena that undermine human security, they have the potential to 
exacerbate conflict. The EU statement in the July 2020 open debate 
captured this sentiment:
“This meeting is also timely in the current pandemic context, as 
coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues to hit countries across 
the world with unrelenting force, exposing and exacerbating exist-
ing vulnerabilities and compounding the impact of climate change 
on food and water security, livelihoods, social cohesion and security. 
That threatens to undermine development gains and human rights, 
as well as escalate violence and disrupt fragile peace processes.”34 
It has also been observed that climate change, like COVID-19, 
would be most effectively tackled through enhanced international 
solidarity.35 
There has also been a heightened focus on addressing climate-
related security threats as part of the UN’s peacebuilding agenda in 
30. On climate change as a “threat multiplier”, check United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting (Resumption). July 20. https://undocs.org/S/PV.6587(Resumption%201), p.13, 21. Check 
also: United Nations. 2018. Security Council 8307th meeting. July 11. https://undocs.org/S/PV.8307, p.9, 23. United Nations. 2019. Security Council 8451st meeting. January 25. https://undocs.org/S/
PV.8451, p.33, 37. And check also: United Nations. 2021. Security Council VTC meeting. February 25. https://undocs.org/S/2021/198, p.11, 36, 49.
31. United Nations. 2007. Security Council 5663rd meeting. April 17. https://undocs.org/S/PV.5663, p.22-23. Check also: United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting (Resumption). July 
20. https://undocs.org/S/PV.6587(Resumption%201), p.19, 20. And check also: United Nations. 2019. Security Council 8451st meeting. January 25. https://undocs.org/S/PV.8451, p.18, 28, 37, 65. 
32. United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting (Resumption). July 20. https://undocs.org/S/PV.6587(Resumption%201), p.16-17.
33. On the importance of the participation of women and youth check: United Nations. 2019. Security Council 8451st meeting. January 25. https://undocs.org/S/PV.8451, p.34, 59. Check also: United 
Nations. 2021. Security Council VTC meeting. February 25. https://undocs.org/S/2020/198, p.53, 66, 72.
34. United Nations. 2020. Security Council VTC meeting. July 28. https://undocs.org/S/2020/751, p.37.
35. Ibid, p.17, 38.
36. United Nations. 2011. Security Council 6587th meeting (Resumption). July 20. https://undocs.org/S/PV.6587(Resumption%201), p.11, 23, 37.
37. United Nations. 2020. Security Council VTC meeting. July 28. https://undocs.org/S/2020/751, p.39, 78-79.
38. The one exception was the 26 May 2016 meeting on “The Challenges in the Sahel Region”. Spain, which was not Council president, requested the briefing; however, Egypt, which held this monthly 
presidency, collaborated with Spain to prepare a background note for the meeting.
the more recent debates. Peacebuilding was only referenced once in 
the 2007 open debate. The linkages among climate change, security 
and peacebuilding were raised in the 2011 open debate, and have 
become more prominent in the open debates on climate and security 
since 2019. Some member states have maintained that integrating 
climate change considerations into peacebuilding efforts could help 
to prevent conflicts from erupting or escalating.36 In addition, there 
have been calls for the Security Council to make use of the Peace-
building Commission’s advisory role with respect to climate-related 
security threats.37 
Meetings on Related Topics
Over the past decade, the Council has also explored the climate-
security nexus as a part of broader discussions on emerging and non-
traditional threats to international peace and security. These meet-
ings were usually initiated as optional, signature events of Council 
presidencies.38 In several of these meetings, climate change has been 
discussed as one of several transnational security threats (for example, 
transnational organised crime, piracy, drug and human trafficking, 
and pandemics). Other meetings in which climate change has been 
referred to have had a narrower focus – for example, the briefing 
convened by Bolivia on “Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary 
Waters” in June 2017.   
The focus of these meetings indicates the growing interest that a 
regionally diverse group of member states has demonstrated for the 
need to tackle the security impacts of various transnational security 
challenges. The briefings and member state interventions in many 
of these meetings have emphasised the inter-connected nature of 
emerging threats to international peace and security and the impor-
tance of coordination at the international, regional, national and local 
levels to address them most effectively. (Please see Annex II for a list 
of, and information about, these meetings.)
Arria-formula Meetings
Arria-formula meetings have been a common format for discussing 
climate-security issues. These are informal meetings convened at the 
initiative of a member or members of the Security Council (at times 
with the support of non-Council members) to gather information 
from individuals or organisations with special knowledge of a topic. 
There have been six Arria-formula meetings on climate change as a 
security threat (or on directly-related subjects) as at the end of 2020.
The Arria-formula meetings on climate change and security have 
all been public sessions and several have been webcast. As such, they 
may have helped to raise awareness and increase knowledge of cli-
mate-related security threats among Council members and the wider 
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UN membership. These sessions have allowed a diverse group of 
stakeholders to share their perspectives—including Council mem-
bers, other UN member states, UN officials, non-governmental 
organisations and civil society representatives.
The co-sponsorship of the three Arria-formula meetings on cli-
mate-related security matters between 14 December 2017 and 22 
April 2020 reflects a coherent and well-planned effort to generate 
momentum in support of the issue and to maintain a continuity of 
focus on it over time. The large number of co-sponsors included 
contemporaneous Council members, as well as members gearing up 
for Council terms, many of whom staunchly advocated for Council 
involvement on this issue during their tenures. 
The relatively high number of such Arria-formula meetings could 
also be an indication of the political sensitivities around Council 
engagement on this issue. In this respect, influential Council mem-
bers may not have been entirely comfortable with the matter being 
addressed in a more formal way, so the Arria-formula format (which 
does not require consensus to convene, nor do all members always 
participate) became a sensible alternative.39 
There may be less need for the Arria-formula format to be used to 
discuss climate-related security threats if this issue continues to gain 
traction in formal Council settings. The fact that Council members 
have shown greater willingness to hold formal meetings on climate 
change and security as signature events of their monthly presiden-
cies reflects the effort to mainstream the issue in the Council’s work, 
regardless of the political headwinds. (Annex III provides a list of 
relevant Arria-formula meetings and information about them.)
Mainstreaming in country- and region-specific cases
References to climate change in Council outcomes have become 
more frequent since 2017. Prior to 2017, language on climate 
change was sporadically included in presidential statements and 
only once in a resolution on a thematic or country/region-specif-
ic matter. These outcomes tended to note the Council’s concern 
about climate change among a variety of political and security 
threats and its commitment to address this broad array of threats. 
Since 2017, there has been an increase in the number of times the 
Council has referenced climate change in outcomes, as well as a 
substantive change in the language. The more recent outcomes 
have tended to emphasise the importance of addressing climate 
and ecological changes, among other factors, in UN and host gov-
ernment risk assessments and risk management strategies. 
What happened in 2017 to herald the shift in focus that has con-
tinued to this day? Perhaps most importantly, enterprising mem-
bers, starting with Sweden and the Netherlands, took the initiative by 
assiduously promoting this issue, making a concerted effort to inte-
grate climate-security language more systematically into the Coun-
cil’s country-specific outcomes. The Security Council’s visiting mis-
sion to the Lake Chad region in March 2017 on a trip focused on 
the security and humanitarian challenges in the region may have also 
39. A Council member seeking to hold a formal meeting on a controversial topic will usually seek to secure the support or at least acquiescence of all other members.  If this is not possible, that 
member will try to secure the support of at least nine Council members.  This is because if several members object to the meeting, a procedural vote may be held to determine whether the meeting 
can be convened.  Nine affirmative votes are needed for a procedural motion to pass.     
played a role. During the visiting mission, some of the government 
officials in Niger and Nigeria that met with members shared their 
view that climate change had had a harmful effect on livelihoods in 
the region. Among them was Nigerien President Mahamadou Issou-
fou, who told Council members that he did not believe that Boko 
Haram would have “taken root” without the shrinking of Lake Chad, 
observing that the Lake had lost 90 percent of its surface area since 
the 1960s with a devastating effect on local livelihoods. The linking 
of climate change to security described during the visiting mission 
appeared to make an impression on a number of members as an 
issue meriting careful attention. In the past few years, there has also 
been continuity of interest and follow through on climate change and 
security matters; several incoming Council members have taken the 
baton from those leaving the body and continued to promote the 
issue. This helps explain why there have been more thematic meet-
ings on climate change and security since 2018 than in the prior 11 
years dating back to the UK’s 2007 open debate.
Shortly after this visiting mission to the Lake Chad Basin region 
in March 2017, the Council adopted resolution 2349, which 
addressed the negative security, humanitarian and developmental 
dimensions of the Boko Haram crisis in the region. The resolution 
recognised the “adverse effects of climate change and ecological 
changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, includ-
ing through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degrada-
tion, and food insecurity, and emphasise[d] the need for adequate 
risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments 
and the United Nations relating to these factors”. This language 
has become a model for text on climate change and ecological 
changes in many Council outcomes in the following years, with 
variations, depending on the region or country.
To date, in addition to a small number of thematic outcomes, 
language on climate change and security has been integrated pri-
marily into outcomes dealing with Africa. In addition to the Lake 
Chad Basin, the Council has recognised the negative effects of cli-
mate change in West Africa, Somalia, Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, 
the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and Central Africa. It has also referred to climate change 
in a resolution on the “Silencing the Guns in Africa” initiative in 
February 2019, as well as in two earlier thematic outcomes (an 
October 2015 Women, Peace and Security resolution and a July 
2014 counter-terrorism resolution).
In 2021, the Council, for the first time, expanded the geographic 
focus of outcomes referencing climate change beyond Africa. On 29 
January 2021, it adopted resolution 2561, which renewed the man-
date of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and on 
27 May 2021, it adopted resolution 2576, renewing the mandate of 
the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Prior to the adop-
tion of resolution 2561 on Cyprus, proposals to incorporate climate-
security language in outcomes on cases outside of Africa—including 
Haiti in 2019 and Iraq in 2020—were not successful. 
Security Council Report Research Report June 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 9
Institutional Developments 
40. United Nations. 2020. “Climate Security Mechanism, Toolbox, Briefing Note.” https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/csm_toolbox-1-briefing_note.pdf , p.10.
41. United Nations. 2020. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa. December 1. https://undocs.
org/S/2020/1154, p.12.
42. For information on Weathering Risk, check www.weatheringrisk.org.
There have been significant institutional developments since 2018 
that have supported the work of the Security Council and the wider 
UN system in addressing climate-related security threats. Notable 
among these have been the establishment of the Climate-Security 
Mechanism (CSM), the Group of Friends on Climate and Security 
and the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Coun-
cil on Climate and Security.  Research initiatives have also been 
launched that support the UN’s engagement on climate-related 
security matters. Furthermore, the Secretary-General is increasingly 
focusing on the threat of climate change, including its negative effects 
on international peace and security. All of these efforts represent a 
growing commitment to the issue among a broad range of actors 
within and outside of the UN.   
Climate-Security Mechanism 
In 2018, the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs 
(DPPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP) jointly established the “Climate-
Security Mechanism” (CSM) to harness information and analysis on 
the linkages between climate change and security and to integrate 
this lens into the organisation’s prevention, peacebuilding, and adap-
tation. The CSM—which is supported through voluntary contribu-
tions—consists of a small team from the three participating entities 
and works closely with a large number of UN agencies, funds and 
programmes, UN peace operations, as well as with partners outside 
the UN system. It has created a “toolbox” that includes a series of 
short guidance documents designed “to help the UN system develop 
a shared language and approach to the challenges brought on by 
climate-related security risks”.40 These documents include: 
• a “briefing note” that provides an overview of linkages between 
climate change and peace and security;  
• a “conceptual approach” that delineates a common perspective 
for assessing climate change-related security risks across the UN 
system;  
• “data sources” on security risks related to climate change; and a 
• “conflict analysis checklist” with climate change-related questions 
for consideration during conflict analyses.  
The toolbox—which the CSM has introduced to a wide audience 
of UN and non-UN practitioners through webinars and workshops—
emphasises that climate-related security threats are context specific; 
that they interact with various political, social, economic, and demo-
graphic challenges contributing to instability; and that climate change 
has wide-ranging and interlinking development, peace and security, 
humanitarian, and gender implications. Not least, it also stresses that 
climate security risk prevention and management mechanisms need 
to consider and build upon existing coping capacities in states and 
communities to be effective.
The CSM has also worked with UN regional offices, including 
the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the 
UN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), to help address climate-
related security risks. In 2020, in collaboration with UNOCA, the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and UN 
Country Teams in the sub-region, it “developed a two-year project to 
strengthen the knowledge base regarding the interlinkages between 
climate change and security in Central Africa and the capacity of 
subregional actors to develop effective risk prevention and mitiga-
tion strategies”.41 The CSM also supports UNOWAS to expand its 
work on climate security and conduct analytical deep dives, which 
will inform the mission’s political and prevention work in West Africa 
and the Sahel.
Group of Friends on Climate and Security 
Germany and Nauru are the co-founders and co-chairs of the 
Group of Friends on Climate and Security. Initially consisting of 
27 UN member states, the Group has more than doubled in size 
since its establishment on 1 August 2018. As at 7 May 2021, it 
consisted of 57 member states—representing all five UN regional 
groups (the African Group, the Asia-Pacific Group, the Eastern 
European Group, the Western European and Others Group, and 
the Latin American and Caribbean Group)—and the EU. Ten cur-
rent Security Council members—Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, 
Mexico, Niger, Norway, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the UK, 
and the US—belong to the Group. The Climate-Security Mecha-
nism (CSM) and the ICRC are permanent observers. The goal of 
the Group is to inform policy on climate change’s security effects, 
to heighten public awareness of these effects, and to strengthen the 
UN system’s efforts to counter them. 
The Group meets periodically during the year. Some meetings 
are held at expert level and others at permanent representative level 
(at least twice per year). Briefers have included senior UN officials 
and think tank experts.
The plan for 2021 is for the Group to convene regularly, and 
as at 30 April, the Group had met twice. On 5 March, it convened 
virtually at ambassador level. During the meeting, the permanent 
representatives of Ireland, Niger and the UK provided an update on 
recent developments in the Security Council on climate-related secu-
rity matters; one of the ambassadors emphasised the importance of 
strengthening the capacity of UN field missions to integrate climate-
security concerns into their work. Featured briefers at the meeting 
included Johan Rockström, the Director of the Potsdam Institute 
for Climate Impact Research; Inger Andersen, Executive Director 
of UNEP; and George Conway, the Deputy Director of the UNDP 
Crisis Bureau. Rockström described the “Weathering Risk” project, a 
climate and security risk and foresight assessment led by the Potsdam 
Institute and adelphi (a Berlin-based think tank that studies environ-
mental issues).42 Andersen noted how climate science is informing 
the work of UNEP, and Conway spoke about the work of the CSM. 
Several issues were raised in the ensuing discussion. Among other 
things, member states in the Group underscored the importance of 
integrating climate change considerations in a coherent way through-
out the UN’s work, drawing on local knowledge to address climate-
related security risks in affected countries, and stepping up global 
mitigation and adaptation measures. Several themes explored in the 5 
March meeting were revisited in a subsequent meeting of the Group 
of Friends, held at expert level on 1 April. 
The Group of Friends currently has two standing agenda items: 
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one on the work of the CSM, and a second on the work of and 
dynamics in the Security Council, including the activities of the 
Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Cli-
mate and Security (IEG). (The work of the IEG is described below). 
A CSM representative briefs on the first standing agenda item, while 
one of the IEG co-chairs briefs on the second. These standing agenda 
items are designed to strengthen the interactions between the Group 
of Friends and key actors in the UN system working on climate 
change and security matters. Over time, the Group of Friends could 
become a useful sounding board for ideas on how to advance the 
climate security agenda in the Security Council. 
For the remainder of 2021, the Group intends to hold both 
country- and region-specific and cross-cutting discussions—allow-
ing members to delve into geographical areas where climate change 
poses security risks and to explore the connections between climate 
change and thematic issues such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and 
migration, among others. It plans to hear from experts living in areas 
suffering the security effects of climate change.
Certain themes consistently emerge in the public statements of 
the Group of Friends—including its September 2019 joint posi-
tion43 and interventions made on its behalf in the Security Council 
by Nauru and Germany during the 24 July 2020 and 23 Febru-
ary 2021 open debates, respectively. A consistent message is that 
addressing the adverse impacts of climate change, including in rela-
tion to peace and security, requires coordinated action from various 
parts of the UN system, including the Security Council. The Group 
has repeatedly called for the appointment of a Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General to coordinate the UN’s response to 
climate-related security risks. It has emphasised the need for these 
risks to be analysed in a periodic report of the Secretary-General. 
In the Group of Friends’ 24 July 2020 statement to the Council, 
Nauru maintained that: “Such reports should include an assess-
ment of early warning indicators and foresights of climate-related 
security risks, as well as concrete recommendations for action by 
UN organs to address these risks.” It added that this “would con-
tribute to the ability of the Security Council to detect, address and 
prevent looming crisis and conflicts before they become a reality”. 
The importance of enhancing efforts to mitigate the emission of 
greenhouse gases and adapt to the consequences of climate change 
is another key message of the Group of Friends.  
Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council 
on Climate and Security
During 2019 and early 2020, several members of the Security Coun-
cil had informally and discreetly discussed the idea of establishing an 
informal expert group on climate and security to facilitate more sys-
tematic engagement by the Council on climate-related security mat-
ters. The proposal for such a group had been one of the elements of 
the draft resolution on climate change and security that ten Council 
members had pursued in the lead-up to the 24 July 2020 debate, but 
that was aborted due to resistance from the US, China and Russia. 
At the 24 July 2020 virtual open debate on climate and secu-
rity, Germany publicly announced for the first time the intention 
43. At the time of writing, 36 members of the Group of Friends had signed the joint position. Signing the document is not a requirement for membership in the Group, which is designed to bring 
together member states with a desire to promote the climate-security agenda, but not to compel them to adopt particular positions
44. United Nations. 2020. Letter dated 27 August 2020 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. August 28. 
https://undocs.org/S/2020/849.
45. There are two other informal subsidiary bodies of Council members. One is Informal Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians, which was formed in 2009, and has always been chaired by the UK. 
to establish an informal expert group. In the open debate, Belgium 
supported this initiative. Current Council member Ireland, which 
had won a seat in the June 2020 election for a 2021-22 term, also 
welcomed the Group’s creation during the meeting.
Following the debate, ten members of the Security Council (Bel-
gium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, 
Tunisia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the United Kingdom, and 
Viet Nam)—as well as three of the incoming members of the Security 
Council (Ireland, Kenya and Norway)—released a joint statement in 
which they emphasised the need for the Council to address climate-
security risks and for the UN system to strengthen its operational 
readiness in special cases in this regard. In the statement, the ten 
Council members announced that they would convene an “Infor-
mal Group of Experts of the Security Council in order to assist the 
Council to achieve a more comprehensive and systematic approach 
on climate-related security risks in situations on the agenda”.
On 27 August 2020, the ten members submitted a letter to the 
Secretary-General in which they described their rationale for estab-
lishing the expert group, as well as its envisioned functions and work-
ing methods.44 They said that “the Council would benefit from a 
more systematic approach and more consistent attention to [climate-
related security risks]…including during the formulation of man-
dates and consultations on their renewal”. They added that the expert 
group would “provide a space for transparent, regular and systematic 
consultations between country experts and United Nations entities 
on climate-related security risks in order to improve the understand-
ing of the adverse effects of climate change on peace and security and 
help strengthen the Council’s efforts to mainstream the climate and 
security agenda in its daily work”. They also announced that Niger 
and Germany would serve as initial co-chairs of the expert group 
for the remainder of 2020. Finally, they asked for the Department 
of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), “in the context of 
the Climate Security Mechanism”, to serve as the secretariat for the 
informal expert group, coordinate the flow of information to Coun-
cil members regarding its work, and facilitate the group’s meetings.
The establishment of the Informal Expert Group was contro-
versial. China and Russia emphasised that the group had no formal 
standing as a subsidiary body of the Council, noting its informal 
nature and the fact that its formation did not have the support of all 
Council members. The members of the Informal Expert Group had 
never claimed that the Group would be a formal subsidiary body of 
the Council; hence, consensus was not a prerequisite to its forma-
tion. However, the ten members launching the group agreed to a 
compromise, calling the new entity the “Informal Expert Group of 
Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security” rather 
than the “Informal Expert Group of the Security Council on Cli-
mate and Security”. The inclusion of the term “members of” in the 
Group’s title was meant to emphasise its informal standing, just as 
informal Council products such as press statements are issued by 
“members of the Security Council”, whereas the organ’s formal out-
comes (resolutions and presidential statements) are adopted by the 
Security Council.45 
China and Russia also raised objections to the proposal that 
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the Climate-Security Mechanism (CSM) serve as a secretariat for 
the expert group. In particular, they did not believe that Secretari-
at resources should be expended on this initiative; while the CSM 
is funded through voluntary contributions, staff from the Depart-
ment of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs—who are supported by 
assessed contributions—oversee it. They may have also feared that 
a Secretariat role in the work of the Informal Expert Group would 
accord it a level of legitimacy that they did not wish to see. In 2021, 
the co-chairs of the Informal Expert Group (Ireland and Niger) 
were serving as the Secretariat for this body, and it remained unclear 
whether the CSM would eventually play this role, as envisioned by 
several Council members. 
On 20 November 2020, the Informal Expert Group met for the 
first time. The meeting, which was held at ambassador-level, focused 
on the security implications of climate change in Somalia. Special 
Representative and head of UNSOM James Swan briefed, and Dan 
Smith, Director of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
participated in the meeting. All fifteen Security Council members 
and four incoming members (Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, and Norway) 
took part in the meeting; India was the only incoming member not 
participating. During the meeting, Russia indicated that it was par-
ticipating as an observer, but not joining the Informal Expert Group.
The day before the meeting, China sent a letter to Germany and 
Niger, as the Group’s co-chairs, saying that they would send an expert 
to the meeting to follow the discussion, but that their participation 
“should not be interpreted as China joining” the Informal Expert 
Group. They further declared in the letter: “we all understand that 
there is no official decision of the Council to establish an informal 
expert group on climate and security and it’s inappropriate for the 
DPPA to act as the secretariat for such an informal group”, while 
acknowledging that they “respect the right of Council members to 
discuss issues of common interest”.
On 12 March 2021, the Informal Expert Group met again. The 
expert-level meeting focused on the Sahel, and it explored how the 
UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) in particular is 
addressing climate-security risks in the region. Ngozi Amu, the Team 
Leader and Head of Research and Analysis of UNOWAS, briefed the 
members of the Group. Russia was the only Council member that did 
not attend the meeting, while China and India attended as observers. 
Another expert-level meeting of the Informal Expert Group took 
place on 30 April and focused on South Sudan. Deputy Special 
Representative (Political) for South Sudan and Deputy Head of the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Guang Cong 
briefed. Cong referred to flooding and drought in parts of South 
The other is the informal Experts Group on Women, Peace and Security, which was established in late 2015, and is chaired in 2021 by Ireland and Mexico. 
46. Climate Security Expert Network. n.d. https://climate-security-expert-network.org/.
47. Ibid.
48. Climate Security Expert Network. n.d. Library. https://climate-security-expert-network.org/library. 
49. Rüttinger, Lukas. 2020. “Climate Change in the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Fund.” February. https://climate-security-expert-network.org/sites/climate-security-expert-network.org/files/
documents/csen_policy_paper_climate_change_in_the_un_pbc_and_pbf.pdf. Check also: König, Christian, and Janani Vivekananda. 2020. “How Can UN Organs Respond to Climate-Security Risks.” 
July. https://climate-security-expert-network.org/sites/climate-security-expert-network.org/files/documents/how_can_un_organs_respond_to_climate_security_risks.pdf. And check also: Vivekananda, 
Janani, Day, Adam, and Susanne Wolfmaier. 2020. What can the UN Security Council do on Climate and Security? Berlin: Climate Security Expert Network. https://climate-security-expert-network.
org/sites/climate-security-expert-network.com/files/documents/what_can_the_un_security_council_do_on_climate_and_security_v2.pdf.
50. SIPRI. 2021. “SIPRI and NUPI form Cooperation to Inform Security Council”. February 4. https://www.sipri.org/news/2021/sipri-and-nupi-form-cooperation-inform-un-security-council#:~:text=The%20
aim%20of%20the%20collaboration,regions%20on%20the%20council’s%20agenda.
51. SIPRI and NUPI. 2021. “Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet, Somalia.” February. https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/210203%20FINAL%20Fact%20Sheet%20Somalia%20Skisser%20LR11.pdf.
52. SIPRI and NUPI. 2021. “Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet, South Sudan. March. https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet%20South%20Sudan_HR.pdf
53. SIPRI and NUPI. 2021. “Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet, the Sahel. April. https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/NUPI_Fact_Sheet_Sahel_LR5.pdf
54. SIPRI and NUPI 2021. “Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet, Mali. May. https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/210526%20Final%20Mali%20Climate%20Peace%20Security%20Fact%20
Sheet_EN.pdf
Sudan as factors increasing conflict risks, and he described the mis-
sion’s efforts to mitigate herder-farmer tensions. While Russia did not 
participate, the 14 other Council members were present, with China 
and India again taking part as observers.
Research Initiatives 
In 2019, the Climate Security Expert Network (CSEN) was launched 
as “a hub for research on the linkages between climate and securi-
ty, the effects of climate change on security and responses to these 
issues”.46 The Berlin-based think-tank, adelphi, serves as the Secre-
tariat for the Network. Comprised of approximately 30 experts and 
supported by the German government, the CSEN assists the Cli-
mate-Security Mechanism and the Group of Friends on Climate and 
Security by “synthesising scientific knowledge and expertise, advising 
on entry points for building resilience to climate-security risks, and 
helping to strengthen a shared understanding of the challenges and 
opportunities of addressing climate-related security risks”.47
The CSEN produces reports on the climate-security risks in 
various countries and regions—many of which are on the Security 
Council’s agenda—that include entry points for addressing these 
risks. Each report is accompanied by a concise fact sheet that high-
lights its key elements. To date, CSEN experts have written reports 
and accompanying fact sheets on the following cases: Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia, the Caribbean, Latin America and the Caribbean, Mali, 
Nepal, North Africa and the Sahel, Northern Central America, Pacif-
ic Islands Region, South Asia, and Sudan.48 They have also written 
longer policy papers to help inform decision-making on climate-
security issues, including in relation to the UN system.49 
In 2020, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
initiated the Climate-related Peace and Security Risk project, a three-
year initiative funded by the Norwegian government that assesses 
climate-related security and development risks in certain cases on 
the Security Council’s agenda.50 As part of this initiative, SIPRI and 
NUPI are producing fact sheets highlighting the relevant risks in dif-
ferent situations and proposing recommendations for international 
and national responses; the facts sheets are produced after consult-
ing with a wide range of stakeholders, including the host government. 
The first of these focused on Somalia and was published in February 
2021, shortly before the Security Council considered the mandate 
of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).51 As at May 
2021, additional fact sheets had been published on South Sudan,52 
the Sahel,53 and Mali.54 The SIRPI-NUPI initiative is also intended 
to develop research collaborations between Nordic-Baltic experts 
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and cross-regional partnerships with research institutions in conflict-
affected and otherwise vulnerable states.
The Secretary-General 
Secretary-General António Guterres has increasingly used his office 
to raise the alarm about the climate crisis. In a trip to the Asia Pacific 
in May 2019, he noted that climate change is an existential threat for 
some of the Pacific Island States. More recently, briefing the Security 
Council at the UK’s February 2021 debate on climate-related security 
risks, Guterres called the “climate emergency…the defining issue of 
our time”, and advocated for enhanced “preparations for the escalat-
ing implications of the climate crisis for international peace and secu-
rity”. He outlined four priorities to address the crisis. First, he called 
for the cutting of emissions, including through ambitious, nationally 
determined contributions. Second, he urged increased investment to 
help countries and communities adapt and develop resilience to cli-
mate-related disasters such as storms and droughts. Third, Guterres 
encouraged the “embrace of a concept of security that puts people at 
its centre”, whereby “[p]reventing and addressing the poverty, food 
insecurity and displacement caused by climate disruption contribute 
to sustaining peace and reducing the risk of conflict”. Finally, he called 
for a collaborative approach among different actors within and outside 
of the UN system to help tackle the climate crisis.55
55. United Nations. 2020. Letter dated 27 August 2020 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. August 28. 
https://undocs.org/S/2020/849.
56. United Nations. n.d. Selwin Charles Hart Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Climate Action and Assistant Secretary-General for the Climate Action Team. https://www.un.org/sg/en/
content/profiles/selwin-hart.
57. United Nations. 2021. Mr. Michael R. Bloomberg of the United States - Special Envoy on Climate Ambition and Solutions. February 5. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/
personnel-appointments/2021-02-05/mr-michael-r-bloomberg-of-the-united-states%C2%A0-special-envoy-climate-ambition-and-solutions%C2%A0-%C2%A0%C2%A0%C2%A0.
58. United Nations. 2019. Mr. Mark Joseph Carney of Canada - Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance. December 1. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2019-12-01/
mr-mark-joseph-carney-of-canada-special-envoy-climate-action-and-finance.
Three climate envoys support the Secretary-General’s efforts to 
tackle climate mitigation and adaptation, although none of them have 
roles related to the immediate security effects of climate change. The 
Special Advisor to the Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-
General of the Climate Action Team occupies the most operational 
role day-to-day. Appointed in February 2020 and overseeing a small 
team, Selwin Hart is tasked with focusing on “Member State support, 
coalition-building, UN system engagement and public mobilization 
necessary to implement the Paris Agreement”. He helps to promote 
the Secretary-General’s efforts to enhance Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) and phase out fossil fuel and coal, among 
other responsibilities.56 Michael Bloomberg, the UN Special Envoy 
on Climate Ambition and Solutions, is responsible for mobilising 
“strong and more ambitious climate action” by “support[ing] the 
work of the Secretary-General in growing and strengthening the 
coalition of governments, companies, cities and financial institutions 
committing to net-zero before 2050 in line with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement”.57 And Mark Carney, who was appointed in December 
2019, serves as the UN Envoy for Climate Action and Finance.  He 
works towards “shifting public and private finance markets and mobi-
lizing private finance to the levels needed to achieve the 1.5˚C goal 
of the Paris Agreement”.58 
Council Dynamics: The Current State of Play  
All current members of the Security Council recognise that climate 
change poses an existential threat to human civilisation. They all 
share the view that the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change is the primary international mechanism for dealing with 
the mitigation and adaptation challenges of climate change and that 
international efforts to reduce carbon emissions must be significantly 
stepped up as a matter of urgency. One hundred and ninety-one 
countries (including all Security Council members) have agreed to 
the Paris Agreement, which was negotiated under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC. The US, whose decision to withdraw from the agreement 
went into effect in November 2020, rejoined it in February 2021.  
The main division among Security Council members is not, 
therefore, whether climate change exists or whether it has adverse 
socioeconomic, developmental, or even security effects. The divi-
sion is over what role the Security Council should play in combat-
ing this threat, and under what circumstances. Often, the question 
comes down to whether the security impacts of climate change 
are clear enough in a given situation on its agenda to merit the 
Council’s attention.
As at mid-2021, there are 12 Security Council members that 
believe that the Security Council, working in cooperation with 
other parts of the UN system, should be an important factor in 
the effort to resolve the security effects of climate change. Many 
of these countries have emphasised that climate change should be 
integrated more systematically into the Council’s work, and that 
enhanced analysis of climate-related security threats is needed 
to help the UN, including the Security Council, to develop more 
effective responses. They often emphasise that factors such as 
drought, water scarcity, food insecurity, desertification, and dis-
placement that are caused or exacerbated by climate change are 
conflict risk multipliers. They see the Security Council as part of 
a larger constellation of actors within and outside the UN system 
working together to address the security impacts of climate change. 
Many of the elected members that support Council involvement 
on this issue have emphasised that addressing climate-related secu-
rity threats is a priority of their Council tenures. A number of these 
members are particularly sensitive to the issue because they have 
witnessed its impact first-hand in their home countries and regions. 
When the Dominican Republic convened a debate on climate change 
and security during its January 2019 presidency, its then-foreign min-
ister, Miguel Vargas Maldonado, stated: “The Dominican Republic 
brings to the table the voice of the countries that suffer more intensely 
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the effects of natural disasters as a result of climate change, due to 
both their geographic location and their institutional and/or eco-
nomic vulnerabilities. For that reason, we feel that it is particularly 
urgent for the Security Council to reach consensus on the best way 
to include climate-related effects in its work on security.”59 Current 
Council members from the developing world have expressed simi-
lar sentiments. At the 23 February 2021 open debate on “Address-
ing climate-related security risks to international peace and secu-
rity through mitigation and resilience building”, Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta said: “no body with such a strong mandate should 
step aside from this challenge. That is why one of our priorities…
during our term on the Security Council, is to clarify the importance 
of the climate and security nexus.”60 President Kenyatta went on to 
observe how the “drought-stricken Horn of Africa, the drying up 
Lake Chad basin and the shrinking Sahel and savannah grasslands 
have worsened economic vulnerabilities and set in motion politi-
cal, demographic and migratory dynamics that increase the threat 
of insurgency and violent extremism”.61 At the same open debate, 
Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed alluded to the negative impact of cli-
mate change in Africa and affirmed: “The Republic of Tunisia gives 
the highest priority to this matter through its current membership of 
the Security Council and through other international and regional 
bodies.”62 Niger has also often referred to the ways in which climate 
change has bred insecurity in the Sahel region, including by contrib-
uting to farmer-herder tensions over scarce resources.63 
When Germany left the Council at the end of 2020, Ireland and 
Norway both vied to replace it as a co-chair of the Informal Expert 
Group on Climate and Security, alongside Niger. With neither coun-
try keen to forfeit the role, they struck a compromise of splitting co-
chairmanship of the Group during their 2021-2022 Council tenures; 
Ireland is serving as a co-chair of the Group in 2021, while Norway is 
expected to assume this role in 2022. The two countries have agreed 
to work closely together to promote an efficient and smooth transi-
tion between the two periods. 
The biggest change to Council dynamics in 2021 has been the 
reversal of the earlier US position. The Biden administration’s views 
on climate change in general, and on Council engagement on this 
issue in particular, are diametrically opposed to those of the previous 
administration, which included climate deniers at the highest level. 
During the Trump administration, the US joined China and Rus-
sia in contesting the integration and expansion of climate language 
in some country-specific Council outcomes, and as noted above, it 
disapproved of a thematic resolution on climate and security in July 
2020. The Biden administration has embraced a Council role on 
climate-related security matters. It has supported the inclusion of cli-
mate change and security language in a number of Security Council 
outcomes. In his statement to the Council during the 23 February 
59. United Nations. 2019. Security Council 8451st meeting. January 25. https://undocs.org/S/PV.8451, p.24.
60. United Nations. 2021. Security Council VTC meeting. February 25. https://undocs.org/S/2021/198, p.13.
61. Ibid, p.13.
62. Ibid, p.15.
63. Ibid, p. 19. See also United Nations. 2020. Security Council VTC meeting. July 28. https://undocs.org/S/2020/751, p.5.
64. United Nations. 2021. Security Council VTC meeting. February 25. https://undocs.org/S/2021/198, p.37.
65. Ibid, p.40
66. Ibid, p.33.
67. In the open debate on “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security” in January 2019, the Indian representative stated: “Thinking in security terms 
usually engenders overly militarized solutions to problems that inherently require non-military responses to resolve them. In short, it brings the wrong actors to the table. As the saying goes, if all you 
have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” United Nations. 2019. Security Council 8451st meeting. January 25. https://undocs.org/S/PV.8451, p.43.
2021 open debate, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry 
declared: “…here in the United Nations Security Council, the United 
States will work closely with our like-minded colleagues to focus the 
Security Council’s attentions on the climate crisis and its conse-
quences for international peace and security.”64 Less than one month 
later, on 18 March 2021, President Biden announced that the US 
would join the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security dur-
ing a virtual meeting with Security Council members. And on 8 April 
2021, the US joined the Group of Friends on Climate and Security. 
China and Russia have long been sceptical of Council engagement 
on this issue. They believe that climate change is fundamentally a 
sustainable development issue (rather than a matter of international 
peace and security) that is more appropriately addressed by other 
parts of the UN system, such as the General Assembly, the UNFCCC, 
ECOSOC, and the UN’s development system. While emphasising 
the importance of mitigation and adaptation measures in addressing 
climate change, both countries underscore the need for donor coun-
tries to provide support to developing countries through technology 
transfers and climate financing. They chafe at what they believe is an 
effort by other Council members to draw generalised links between 
climate change and threats to international peace and security. China 
and Russia have noted that climate change can worsen conflict in 
particular situations on the Council’s agenda, but emphasise that 
evidence of direct causal linkages between climate change and con-
flict is lacking. Russia in particular cautions that focusing on climate 
change could divert the Council’s attention from other more basic 
security threats; in this respect, Russian ambassador Vassily Nebenzia 
has asserted that, “to assume that climate change is the root cause of 
security issues would mean failing to determine its true causes and 
taking the wrong path when trying to resolve those issues”.65 
India, like China and Russia, has strong doubts about a Council 
role, although it did agree in March 2021 to include a reference 
acknowledging the adverse effects of climate change and the need 
for risk assessments and strategies in a resolution renewing the 
mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). India has 
suggested that climate change should be discussed in more repre-
sentative fora than the 15-member Security Council, while warning 
against “securitization” of the issue. In the February open debate 
on climate and security, India’s Minister of Environment, Forest 
and Climate Change, Prakash Javadekar, expressed concern that 
a “securitized” approach would “establish a parallel climate track” 
when the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement represent “a deli-
cately balanced global democratic effort to take climate action”.66 
In the past, it has posited the risk, in its view, that the Council could 
pursue coercive measures to address this challenge.67 It emphasises, 
as Russia and China do, the importance of developed countries 
honouring commitments to provide climate financing, technology 
14  securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Research Report June 2021
Council Dynamics: The Current State of Play  
transfers and capacity-building to the developing world to help 
address the climate crisis.68 
The Council dynamics surrounding climate and security can 
be expected to shift in the years to come. 2022 will see four mem-
bers (Brazil, China, India, and Russia) with reservations about 
68. United Nations. 2021. Security Council VTC meeting. February 25. https://undocs.org/S/2021/198, p.34.
69. Ibid, p 60-61.
70. In this regard, it is worth noting that Security Council outcomes with climate change references emphasise the importance of risk assessment and risk management strategies for host govern-
ments and the UN (emphasis added), not the just the UN peace operation under consideration.
71. United Nations. 2020. Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. December 24. https://undocs.org/S/2020/1293, p.13.
72. Ibid.
73. United Nations. 2020. Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa. December 1. https://undocs.
org/S/2020/1154, p.12.
climate-security matters being under the Council’s purview. Brazil, 
which has been reluctant about Council engagement on climate 
change and security in the past,69 won a seat for a 2022-2023 term 
in the Council in the 11 June 2021 Security Council elections in 
the General Assembly. 
Options for Action 
This section proposes some potential avenues for advancing the cli-
mate-security agenda in the Security Council. It discusses possible 
approaches to integrating climate-related security language into out-
comes, while touching upon efforts in the field to address climate-
related security threats. It explores the possibility of the Council once 
again attempting to pursue a thematic resolution on this issue, and 
it describes ways in which the UN’s peacebuilding work can be an 
entry point for enhanced Council engagement on climate change 
and security. Finally, it proposes some options for the work of the 
Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security.  
Climate Change and Country- and Region-Specific 
Outcomes
Efforts to integrate climate change language into country- and 
region-specific outcomes are certain to continue. Incorporating 
climate-security language into the operative part of resolutions on 
peace operations with greater consistency in cases where climate 
change poses security risks could help to move the agenda forward, 
as such references are most frequently made in the preambular parts 
of resolutions. Field presences are likely to be accorded enhanced 
resources to execute climate-related tasks—for example, calls for 
risk assessment and risk management strategies on climate change’s 
adverse effects—if they are referenced in the operative section—that 
is, in the part of resolutions where mandates are outlined. In addition, 
including climate-security language in the operative part of more 
resolutions, as opposed to the preamble, could help to elevate the 
normative profile of the issue.  
Most country- and region-specific outcomes referring to climate 
change have focused on African cases. However, as noted above, the 
Council expanded climate change language to resolutions on Cyprus 
and Iraq in February and May 2021, respectively. Continued efforts 
to expand climate change text to other relevant situations would seem 
a logical step; at the very least, this would help to develop the norma-
tive framework for Council engagement on this issue with the goal 
of promoting constructive responses to security concerns. Mandate 
renewals for the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and the UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have been considered 
prime candidates for the inclusion of climate change language. As at 
mid-2021, the political environment appears more favourable toward 
casting the net wider, given that the new administration in the US 
is positively disposed to the Council’s work on climate change and 
security. The UNAMI example demonstrates this point. In a depar-
ture from 2020, the integration of climate and security language in 
the UNAMI resolution succeeded in 2021, due at least in part to the 
change in the position of the US, which is the penholder on Iraq. The 
US is also the penholder on Haiti, as well as an influential actor on 
the Afghanistan file, giving it a significant voice in the negotiations 
on BINUH and UNAMA.
Of course, securing references to climate change in Security 
Council outcomes is only a small part of the equation. The most 
important consideration is how this language is implemented on the 
ground and what impact it makes in real life situations. 
A number of UN peace operations already do considerable work 
to address climate-security concerns, often in conjunction with UN 
Country Teams and other partners.70 In December 2020, UNOWAS 
collaborated with UN Women and the Working Group on Women, 
Youth, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel (which con-
sists of representatives from various countries in the sub-region) 
to conduct climate-security risk assessments in Nigeria and Libe-
ria.71 These assessments—and well as other fieldwork by UNOWAS 
and UN Country Teams in the sub-region—are expected to form 
the basis of an upcoming report that will “inform the support that 
ECOWAS and the United Nations…provide to Member States in the 
development of national climate change adaptation plans, including 
the integration of conflict prevention approaches.”72 As noted above, 
UNOCA, the UN Climate-Security Mechanism, the Economic 
Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS), and UN Country 
Teams in Central Africa are collaborating to enhance their under-
standing of the relationship between climate change and security in 
Central Africa and to strengthen the capacity of the sub-region to 
mitigate these risks.73 In Somalia, an environment advisor, who was 
deployed to the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in the 
autumn of 2020, has been training Somali government officials and 
UN staff to analyse the linkages between climate change and security, 
and advising UN mediation efforts when environmental factors play 
a role in exacerbating tensions. In this regard, as at May 2021, a UN 
environmental peacebuilding specialist was expected to be temporar-
ily deployed to work with the UNSOM environment advisor to help 
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mediate between two sub-clans in Hirshabelle State contesting land 
and grazing rights. While there may be differing views about how 
much climate change has contributed to herder-farmer conflicts in 
Africa, UN peace operations in places such as the Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, South Sudan, 
and Sudan have continued to work in conjunction with UN country 
teams and other actors on the ground to mitigate tensions related 
to transhumance.74 Aside from specific initiatives, climate-related 
information is also increasingly finding its way into assessments and 
analysis conducted by UN peace operations.75 
Despite these activities, the UN’s efforts to address climate-
security threats are very much a work in progress, and the depth of 
these efforts varies. Nonetheless, if the Security Council continues to 
reflect concern about the current or potential security implications 
of climate change in outcomes on peace operations, these missions 
are likely to require enhanced capacity to report on and mitigate 
these effects. Until the political environment allows for such funds 
to be derived from assessed contributions—and it remains unclear 
when this time might come—member states will need to provide 
support through voluntary contributions, if peace operations are to 
pursue more systematic approaches to the climate change-security 
nexus. In this regard, Dröge has argued that in part “a successful 
approach to limit climate-related security risks…depends on finan-
cial resources for UN institutions as a whole, and especially those 
who provide the Security Council with information.”76 As at May 
2021, the only UN peace operation with a full-time environment 
advisor is the UN Mission in Somalia, although UNOWAS and 
UNOCA are in the process of contracting one environment advi-
sor each; these positions are funded through voluntary contribu-
tions. Climate-related security threats vary by situation, and identi-
fying tailored responses and appropriate resource allocation would 
be helped by bringing more climate-related expertise into peace 
operations and more systematic training of UN staff in analysing 
and understanding responses to climate-related adverse security 
implications. Strengthening the capacity of the Climate-Security 
Mechanism through the UN’s regular budget, politically untenable 
at present, would also strengthen efforts to integrate climate change 
considerations into the UN’s peace and security work.
A Thematic Climate Change Outcome: Building on the 2011 
Presidential Statement 
Council members supporting the organ’s engagement on climate 
change and security matters could decide to pursue a thematic res-
olution or presidential statement on climate change and security, 
resurrecting the aborted 2020 effort. With a new US administra-
tion supportive of the climate-security agenda and 12 of 15 Council 
members favourably disposed to Council engagement on this issue, 
2021 could be a good year to revive that initiative. Given concerns 
expressed by China and Russia about addressing climate change and 
security thematically in the Council, the sponsor(s) of the text would 
74. United Nations Department of Peace Operations. 2020. “Preventing, Mitigating, and Resolving Transhumance Related Conflicts in UN Peacekeeping Settings: A Survey of Practice.” https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/transhumance_and_un_pkos_final_web.pdf, p.ix.
75. Interview with UN official, 18 April 2021.
76. Dröge, Susanne. 2020. “Addressing the Risks of Climate Change: What Role for the UN Security Council SWP Research Paper 6, 2020.” German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
(SWP). June. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2020RP06_UNSC_Climate.pdf, p.6.
77. Interview with a UN official, 13 April 2021.
78. United Nations. 2020. Press Release: Climate Emergency, Inequality among Threats to Be Faced in Post-COVID-19 World, Deputy-Secretary-General Tells Security Council Debate on Conflict 
Drivers. November 3. https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/dsgsm1498.doc.htm.
likely have to moderate their desire for a strong outcome. However, 
even if the final result were a pared-down version of the ambitious 
product originally envisioned, it would be viewed as a step forward 
by those supporting Council engagement on climate-security mat-
ters, given the limited substance of the 2011 presidential statement. 
Securing one or more of the core elements of the 2020 draft—for 
example, the request for a periodic Secretary-General’s report on 
climate change and security, the appointment of a Special Represen-
tative on Climate and Security, the call for climate advisors in UN 
peace operations, or the encouragement of UN field presences to 
consider the security effects of climate change in their assessments, 
analysis and activities—would give climate change and security a 
stronger foothold in the Council’s work. A second thematic outcome 
on this issue (adding to the 2011 presidential statement) could also 
send a strong political signal to the UN Secretariat and UN field 
presences of the importance of addressing climate-security risks in 
conflict-affected and other vulnerable states.77 
In a thematic outcome, the Security Council could also make a 
bold call to the international community of states to step up mitiga-
tion and adaptation efforts, while also recognising the primary role 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
regarding such efforts. Given concerns about encroachment, it 
would be important to emphasise that the UNFCCC is the main 
international mechanism for negotiations on climate change. How-
ever, if there is no significant progress in mitigating carbon emis-
sions and building resilience in vulnerable states, the negative 
security impacts of climate change are likely to become clearer, an 
argument for the Council to pronounce itself on this matter in line 
with its conflict prevention mandate outlined in the UN Charter. 
There are few, if any, international institutions with the political 
clout of the Security Council, and a strong statement on the impor-
tance of mitigation and adaptation could send a powerful message 
to UN member states on the need for action. It might be a tall order 
to integrate such messaging into a Council outcome, as some of 
its permanent members are the largest carbon emitters. But given 
the gravity of the challenge, the major powers adopting a Security 
Council outcome speaking to the importance of mitigation and 
adaptation would be a meaningful sign of leadership.
Climate Change, Security and Peacebuilding
It makes sense that the UN’s peacebuilding efforts consider the 
adverse effects of climate change. Peacebuilding brings holis-
tic approaches to addressing inter-related security, development, 
humanitarian, and human rights risks that undermine peace and 
stability; climate change exacerbates many of these challenges. Peace-
building seeks to build the resilience of post-conflict or otherwise 
vulnerable states to prevent a (re)lapse into conflict, at a time when 
“the climate crisis is…eroding the resilience of communities”, in the 
words of UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed.78 Cli-
mate change is frequently viewed as a risk factor for instability. The 
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UN’s peacebuilding efforts are designed to target risk factors “aimed 
at preventing the outbreak, continuation and recurrence of conflict…
and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development”.79
Awareness of climate-related security risks has prompted the UN’s 
peacebuilding architecture to focus increasingly on this issue.  Several 
relevant meetings in this regard were held in 2020. In July 2020, the 
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) held its first meeting on peace-
building challenges in the Pacific Islands, which focused extensively 
on the risks posed by climate change to the region. In September 
2020, a PBC meeting on the Lake Chad Basin featured extensive 
discussion on the risks posed by climate change and environmental 
degradation. And in September 2020, the Commission submitted a 
statement to the Council’s open debate on the humanitarian impacts 
of environmental degradation—which cited these examples in high-
lighting climate-related challenges and noted that building climate 
resilience can be seen as conducive to peacebuilding.  Perhaps most 
notable in terms of the UN peacebuilding architecture’s commitment 
to this issue, the Security-General’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has 
directly addressed climate-related security threats by investing some 
$63.4 million since 2017 on 29 projects related to climate security in 
20 countries; several of these countries are on the Security Council’s 
agenda. The PBF further intends to commit “greater resources to 
specifically prevent and tackle conflicts resulting from global warm-
ing” in its 2020-2024 strategy.
The Security Council could make greater use of the advisory role 
of PBC by soliciting its input more frequently, including in coun-
try- or region-specific cases where climate change is a security con-
cern. This could include briefings by officials from the Peacebuilding 
Support Office (or the PBC chair) that focus on how the Security 
Council can best work with other parts of the UN system to address 
the security effects of climate change in vulnerable and post-conflict 
settings. These briefings, and other input from the UN’s peacebuild-
ing architecture, could also include specific advice on how to craft 
mandates that are sensitive to the security impacts of climate change. 
One such example was the letter that the Chair of the Peacebuild-
ing Commission transmitted to the Council in December 2019 on 
the peacebuilding priorities in West Africa and the Sahel, only weeks 
prior to the renewal of the Office’s mandate through an exchange of 
letters between the Secretary-General (S/2019/1009 of 19 Decem-
ber 2019) and the Security Council (S/2020/85 of 31 January 2020). 
Among its many elements, the letter noted the “adverse effects of 
climate change” as one of several “[s]erious challenges” that required 
“a comprehensive approach to address the root causes of conflict in 
the Sahel and West Africa, prevent further escalation of conflict, and 
build and sustain peace”. These concerns were echoed in the PBC 
Chair’s briefing to the Council on 16 November 2020 at the meeting 
on the G5 Sahel Joint Force.
Several elements would appear important in generating more reg-
ular input from the PBC on particular mandates. First, the country 
designated as the informal coordinator between the Council and 
PBC (usually an elected member to the Council who concurrently 
serves on the PBC) can play a critical role in identifying opportu-
nities for the PBC to provide advice, and in working with Council 
members to secure agreement to invite the PBC Chair as a briefer or 
otherwise solicit the PBC’s advice. Germany was particularly active 
79. United Nations. 2016. Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016). April 27. https://undocs.org/S/RES/2282(2016), p.1-2.
during 2019-2020 in expanding the number of files in which the 
Council sought the PBC’s advice. Kenya, which succeeded Germany 
in 2021, has been playing a similarly active role, for example, in secur-
ing an invitation to the PBC Chair to brief the Council on the Great 
Lakes region in its meeting in April 2021.
Second, the member who holds the pen on the relevant file can 
also lead on seeking PBC advice, as happened when Côte d’Ivoire was 
the penholder on the Sahel and West Africa in 2019. As a post-con-
flict country in West Africa, the credibility of Côte d’Ivoire’s request 
to the PBC may have been enhanced in the eyes of other Council 
members. France has played a similar role in encouraging the PBC 
to submit advice on the Central African Republic in advance of man-
date renewals of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), although to date, climate change 
has not featured in these discussions. Finally, as the PBC operates by 
consensus and consists of 31 member states with diverse views, the 
PBC chair’s ability to negotiate effectively and strike agreements that 
generate meaningful and substantive advice for the Security Council 
can be vital. In 2020, under Canada’s chairmanship of the PBC, there 
was a significant increase in the number of press statements and writ-
ten products adopted by consensus, many of which required multiple 
rounds of silence procedure before they were agreed.
The Informal Expert Group: Potential Future Activities
The Informal Expert Group, still nascent, could become a key forum 
for equipping Council members with enhanced understanding of cli-
mate-related security threats in various countries and regions. Local 
experts, civil society actors, government officials, UN staff in rel-
evant regions, representatives of regional and sub-regional organisa-
tions, and others with specialised knowledge could provide Informal 
Expert Group members with fine-grained, contextualised analysis 
that could help to inform mandate formulations, interventions in 
debates and other public meetings, and the questions posed of UN 
officials during closed consultations and other informal meetings. 
In this regard, meetings of the Informal Expert Group on specific 
countries or regions could be held shortly before mandate renewals 
or briefings on those same items in the Security Council proper, so 
that the information gleaned from Informal Expert Group meetings 
is current and fresh in the minds of diplomats when they apply it to 
their work in the Council. 
Another option for this Informal Expert Group would be to fol-
low up on climate change-related provisions in Council outcomes 
to gauge how well they are being applied in country- and region-
specific cases and discuss avenues for improved implementation. 
Since UN country teams are often heavily engaged in climate-relat-
ed security work, it would be helpful if representatives of relevant 
UN funds, programmes and agencies were available to answer ques-
tions at these meetings, in addition to the primary briefer, if the 
work of a peace operation is being discussed. This is a practice that 
has been employed by the Informal Working Group on the Protec-
tion of Civilians since 2013, whereby various parts of the UN fam-
ily relevant to the situation under discussion are present to answer 
questions following the initial briefing.  
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Persuasion 
Internal disagreements will continue to challenge the Council’s 
efforts to expand its focus on climate change. In general, a strate-
gic approach that strives to underscore climate-related risks in the 
cases where they are most noticeable, rather than in all cases where 
such risks may occur, would appear prudent. Sceptics need to be 
persuaded that there is a relationship between climate change and 
security that requires the Council’s attention in various contexts. 
Council visiting missions, where members can directly see the 
impacts of climate change on the security environment, could be 
an important vehicle in this regard, as was the case with the visit to 
the Lake Chad Basin in March 2017. Council members organis-
ing future Council visiting missions should be attuned to where 
climate change is affecting the security environment and whether 
the responses of the UN and host governments are working; in 
such cases, members could include activities in the programme 
of such visits that focus on the ways in which climate-related risks 
are being managed. New research by CESN, NUPI/SIPRI, the 
International Crisis Group, and others could also be useful entry 
points for engaging sceptics, making persuasive arguments backed 
by science-based evidence, and garnering more support for Council 
involvement in addressing climate-related security risks. 
Conclusion
The Security Council is increasingly grappling with climate change 
as a security threat.  More and more, meetings on climate change 
and security (and related topics) are being convened, climate-secu-
rity language is being incorporated into resolutions, and various 
mechanisms are being established to help support the Council’s 
work on this issue. But it is difficult to determine the future course 
of Council engagement on climate and security. While most mem-
bers of this organ are committed to a Council role, some influen-
tial members have strong reservations about the extent to which 
it should devote energy and resources to climate change. In addi-
tion, the Council is still trying to understand and define the nature 
of the challenge (which varies depending on the context), and to 
ascertain the Council’s precise role, and added value, in addressing 
climate and security matters. Its outcomes can have strong political 
and legal significance, but they require resources and know-how 
to implement. While the Council has emphasised the need for risk 
assessments and risk management strategies in particular contexts, 
and called for better reporting on climate-security risks, it will be 
more challenging to carry out such tasks if funding is not available 
for climate advisors in peace operations.  
Even if the worst-case scenarios are avoided, the climate crisis is 
likely to deepen. Its consequences for human security will mount, 
bringing linkages between climate-related factors and conflict into 
sharp relief. In such a world, the Council failing to respond will 
make it appear out of touch with fundamental threats to international 
peace and security—and human survival.
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TOPIC DATE ORGANISER FORMAT BRIEFER(S)
Relationship between 
energy, security and 
climate (S/PV.5663 and 
Resumption I)
17 April 2007 United Kingdom Open Debate Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
Impact of climate 
change (S/PV.6587 and 
Resumption I)
20 July 2011 Germany Open Debate Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; Administrator of the United 




11 July 2018 Sweden Debate Deputy Secretary-General, Amina J. Mohammed; Minister of 
Water Resources of Iraq, Hassan Al-Janabi;  representative 
of the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate 
Change, Hindou Ibrahim
Addressing the impacts of 
climate-related disasters 
on international peace and 
security (S/PV.8451)
25 January 2019 Dominican 
Republic
Open debate Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding 
Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo; Administrator of the United Nations 
Development Programme, Achim Steiner; Chief Scientist of 
the World Meteorological Organization Pavel Kabat; Research 
Assistant at the Environmental Security Program of the 
Stimson Center, Lindsay Getschel
Climate and security 
(S/PV. 8748)
14 July 2020 Germany Open debate Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the 
Americas, Miroslav Jenča; Director of the Centre National 
d’Études Stratégiques et de Sécurité in Niger, Mahamadou 
Seidou Magagi; Director of the Sustainable Pacific Consultancy 
in Niue, Coral Pasisi
“Humanitarian effects of 
environmental degradation 
and peace and security”
(S/2020/929)
17 September 2020 Niger Open Debate ICRC President Peter Maurer; Executive Secretary of the UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), Ibrahim Thiaw; 
Earth Ambassador, artist and activist, Inna Modja
Addressing climate-
related security risks to 
international peace and 
security through mitigation 
and resilience building 
(S/2021/198)
23 February 2021 United Kingdom Open debate Secretary-General António Guterres; Chair of the UN Youth 
Advisory Group. Nisreen Elsaim
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80. This list draws from Climate Security Expert Network, “Climate Security at the UNSC – A Short History”, available at:  https://climate-security-expert-network.org/unsc-engagement.
TOPIC DATE ORGANISER FORMAT BRIEFER(S)
“Natural resources and 
conflict” (S/PV.5705)
25 June 2007 Belgium Open Debate Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe; 
President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Sheikha 
Haya Rashed Al Khalifa (Bahrain); President of the Economic 
and Social Council, Ambassador Dalius Čekuolis (Lithuania)
“New challenges to 
international peace and 
security and conflict 
prevention”, including 
pandemics, climate change, 
and transnational organised 
crime (S/PV.6668)
23 November 2011 Portugal Briefing Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Yury Fedotov; United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, António Guterres; Director-General of the World 
Health Organization,  Margaret Chan
“Conflict Prevention 
and Natural Resources” 
(S/PV.6982)
19 June 2013 United 
Kingdom
Open Debate Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson; Chair of the Africa 
Progress Panel and former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan; 
Managing Director of the World Bank, Caroline Anstey; 
Under-Secretary-General and Associate Administrator of the 
United Nations Development Programme, Rebeca Grynspan
“Peace and security 
challenges facing small 
island developing states”; 
climate change, transnational 
organised crime, drug and 
human trafficking, and piracy 
were among the issues 
raised (S/PV.7499)
30 July 2015 New Zealand Open debate Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; Prime Minister of Samoa, 
Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi; Prime Minister of Jamaica, 
Portia Simpson Miller; Minister of Finance of Seychelles, 
Jean-Paul Adam; Premier of Niue, Toke Talagi; Minister 
of Finance of the Cook Islands, Mark Brown; Head of the 
Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, 
Thomas Mayr-Harting 
“Challenges in the Sahel 
Region” (S/PV.7699)
26 May 2016 Spain/Egypt Briefing Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head 
of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, 
Mohamed Ibn Chambas; Executive Director of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and Assistant 
Secretary-General, Jean-Paul Laborde; Executive Secretary 
of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, 
Monique Barbut;  Coordinator of the Association des 
Femmes Peules Autochtones du Tchad, Hindou Oumarou 
Ibrahim; African Union High Representative for Mali 
and the Sahel, Pierre Buyoya; European Union Special 
Representative for the Sahel, Angel Losada
“Water, peace and 
security”; the meeting 
explored such issues as 
the relationship between 
climate change and water 
scarcity, the management 
of transboundary waters, 
and the harmful impact that 
conflict can have on access 
to clean water (S/PV.7818)
22 November 2016 Senegal Open debate Chair of the Global High-Level Panel on Water and Peace, 
Danilo Türk; Vice-President of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, Christine Beerli; President of Strategic 
Foresight Group, Sundeep Waslekar
“Preventive Diplomacy and 
Transboundary Waters” 
(S/PV.7959)
6 June 2017 Bolivia Briefing Secretary-General António Guterres
“Addressing complex 
challenges to international 
peace and security”; the 
meeting explored non-
traditional security threats, 
such as climate change, 
famine, pandemic diseases, 
transnational organised 
crime, and drug trafficking 
(S/PV.8144)
20 December 2017 Japan Open debate Secretary-General António Guterres
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“The Role of Natural 
Resources as a Root Cause 
of Conflict”
(S/2018/901)
16 October 2018 Bolivia Briefing Secretary-General António Guterres
“Contemporary drivers of 
conflict and instability and 
insecurity”; the discussion 
focused on the security 
implications of climate 
change and COVID-19, 
among other factors 
(S/2020/1090)
3 November 2020 Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines
Open debate (VTC) Deputy Secretary-General Amina J. Mohammed; Chief 
Executive Officer of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development Ibrahim Assane Mayaki; Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of the West Indies Hilary Beckles;   President of 
ECOSOC, Ambassador Munir Akram (Pakistan)
Annex III: Arria-Formula Meetings on Climate-Security Matters
TOPIC DATE ORGANISERS BRIEFERS
Security dimensions of climate 
change
15 February 2013 Council members Pakistan and the 
UK
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; High Representative of 
the Secretary-General for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island 
Developing States, Gyan Chandra Acharya (Nepal); Minister-
in-assistance to the President of the Marshall Islands, Tony 
deBrum (the Marshall Islands); Director of the Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Impacts Research, Hans Joachim 
Schellnhuber; World Bank Vice-President for Sustainable 
Development, Inger Andersen
Climate change as a threat 
multiplier for global security
30 June 2015 Council members Spain and 
Malaysia
Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson; Foreign Minister of 
the Marshal Islands Tony deBrum; Association for Indigenous 
Women and Peoples of Chad, Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim; 
Kiribati Climate Action Network, Pelenise Alofa; Sabin Center 
for Climate Change Law at Columbia University, Professor 
Michael Gerrard
Security Implications of 
Climate Change: Sea Level 
Rise
10 April 2017 Council member Ukraine, with 
cooperation from non-Council 
member Germany in preparing the 
session
Ambassador Harald Braun of Germany; Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights 
of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kalin; President of the 
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Major 
General Munir Muniruzzaman
Climate Change: Preparing for 
security implications of rising 
temperatures
14 December 2017 Council members France, Italy, 
Japan, Sweden, and the UK; the 
Netherlands and Peru, which were 
about to enter the Council in 2018; 
and other non-Council members 
Germany, the Maldives and Morocco.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Halbe Zijlstra; 
Co-founder and President of the Center for Climate and 
Security,  Caitlin Werrell
Water, peace and security 26 October 2018 Council members Bolivia, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and the Netherlands; 
members states entering the Council 
for terms in 2019-2020 (Belgium, 
the Dominican Republic, Germany, 
and Indonesia); and Italy, a Council 
member in 2017 during a split term 
with the Netherlands
Chair of the Global High-Level Panel on Water and Peace, 
Danilo Türk; UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political 
Affairs, Miroslav Jenča; Executive Vice President and 
Managing Director of the World Resources Institute on 
behalf of the Water, Peace and Security Initiative, Manish 
Bapna
Climate and security risks: the 
latest data
22 April 2020 Council members Belgium, France, 
the Dominican Republic, Estonia, 
Germany, Niger, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Tunisia, the United 
Kingdom, and Viet Nam
Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding 
Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo; President and CEO, International 
Crisis Group, Robert Malley; Director of Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, Dan Smith
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The Security Council expresses its concern on the impact of the global economic crisis on West African 
economies, since the region is already confronted with development challenges such as rising food insecurity, 
climate change adaptation and mitigation, and youth unemployment. The Council encourages continued 
engagement of financial institutions and development partners to mitigate the adverse effects of the decline 






The Security Council recognizes the responsibility for sustainable development issues, including 
climate change, conferred upon the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.
The Security Council underlines General Assembly resolution 63/281 of June 3, 2009, which: reaffirms 
that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the key instrument for addressing 
climate change, recalls the provisions of the UNFCCC, including the acknowledgement that the global 
nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation 
in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions, and invites the relevant 
organs of the United Nations, as appropriate and within their respective mandates to intensify their efforts in 
considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications.
The Security Council notes General Assembly resolution 65/159 of December 20, 2010, entitled ‘Protection of 
global climate for present and future generations of humankind’.
The Security Council notes that, in response to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 63/281, 
the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly on ‘Climate change and its possible 
security implications’ (A/64/350).
The Security Council expresses its concern that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long 
run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security.
The Security Council expresses its concern that possible security implications of loss of territory of some 
States caused by sea-level-rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States.
The Security Council notes that in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
under its consideration, conflict analysis and contextual information on, inter alia, possible security 
implications of climate change is important, when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge 
to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace. In this 
regard, the Council requests the Secretary-General to ensure that his reporting to the Council contains such 
contextual information.”




The Security Council expresses its concern about the underlying problems in the Sahel region and remains 
engaged in addressing the complex security and political challenges in this region that are inter-related with 
humanitarian and developmental issues as well as adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.




The Security Council reaffirms its concern about the alarming situation in the Sahel region and its 
commitment to address the complex security and political challenges in this region that are interrelated with 
humanitarian and developmental issues as well as adverse effects of climate and ecological changes. The 
Security Council welcomes, in this context, the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) following the transfer of authority from the African-led International 
Support Mission in Mali to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013.




The Security Council reiterates its continued concern about the alarming situation in the Sahel region 
and reaffirms its continued commitment to address the complex security and political challenges in this 
region, which are interrelated with humanitarian and developmental issues as well as the adverse effects 
of climate and ecological changes. The Security Council reiterates its strong condemnation of the recent 
terrorist attacks perpetrated in the region. The Security Council also strongly condemns the abuses of human 




peace and security 




The Security Council reiterates its continued concern about the alarming situation in the Sahel region and 
reaffirms its continued commitment to address the complex security and political challenges to the stability 
and development of the region despite the collective efforts undertaken by the region and the international 
community and reaffirms its continued commitment to address these challenges, which are interrelated with 
humanitarian and developmental issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes. 
The Security Council reiterates the importance of a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated approach 
encompassing governance, security, humanitarian, human rights, developmental and environmental aspects to 
respond to the threats across the Sahel region as well as to address the root causes of these challenges.
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PP.  Noting the changing global context of peace and security, in particular relating to rising violent extremism, 
which can be conducive to terrorism, the increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, 
the impacts of climate change and the global nature of health pandemics, and in this regard reiterating its 
intention to increase attention to women, peace and security as a cross-cutting subject in all relevant thematic 
areas of work on its agenda, including threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,




The Security Council takes note of the report (S/2015/866) of the Secretary-General on the progress 
toward the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) and welcomes 
the briefing on 25 November 2015 by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (SESG) for the Sahel, Ms. 
Hiroute Guebre Sellassie. The Security Council encourages further progress by the United Nations system 
and its partners toward the implementation of the UNISS, including through support to the Group of 5 for 
the Sahel (G5 Sahel) in order to assist in addressing the security and political challenges to the stability and 
development of the Sahel region. The Security Council reaffirms its continued commitment to address all 
these challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse 
effects of climate and ecological changes. The Security Council reiterates the importance of national and 
regional ownership of the UNISS, and commends the growing leadership role assumed by the countries of the 
region. It welcomes in this regard, the establishment of the G5 Sahel, which aims to enhance ownership of the 






The Security Council commends the Special Representative for its participation in the briefing on Peace and 
Security in Africa: Challenges of the Sahel Region” that was held on May 26th, encourages further progress 
by the United Nations system and its partners towards the implementation of the United Nations Integrated 
Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), including through support to the Group of 5 for the Sahel (G5), in order to 
assist in addressing the security and political challenges to the stability and development of the Sahel region 
and reaffirms its continued commitment to address such challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian 






The Security Council encourages further progress by the United Nations system and its partners towards the 
implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), including through support 
to the Group of 5 for the Sahel (G5), in order to assist in addressing the security and political challenges to 
the stability and development of the Sahel region and reaffirms its continued commitment to address such 
challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse effects of 
climate and ecological changes, and, in this regards, highlights the need for adequate risk assessments and 
risk management strategies relating to climate change impacts.




OP. 26: Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on 
the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and 
food insecurity, and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by 






The Security Council encourages further progress by the implementation of the UNISS, including through 
support to the G5, in order to assist in addressing the security and political challenges to the stability and 
development of the Sahel region and reaffirms its continued commitment to address such challenges, 
which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse effects of 
climate and ecological changes, and, in this regard, highlights the need for adequate risk assessments and 






The Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among 
other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, including through drought, desertification, 
land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk 
management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors
The Security Council expresses concern over the overall humanitarian situation in the region, characterized 
by the impact of armed conflict and terrorism, extreme poverty, food insecurity, forced displacement, adverse 
effects of climate change and epidemics, which contribute to the high levels of structural, chronic and 
acute vulnerability in the region and continue to affect populations, and call for significant humanitarian and 
development actions
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Recalling its Presidential statement S/PRST/2011/15, recognising the adverse effects of climate change, 
ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through 
drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasising the need for adequate risk 






PP: Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the stability of Mali, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food 
insecurity, and emphasizing the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the 
government of Mali and the United Nations relating to these factors
OP. 68: Notes the importance for the Government of Mali and the United Nations to take into consideration, as 
appropriate, the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change and other ecological changes 





PP: Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the situation in Darfur, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food 
insecurity
OP. 47: Requests the United Nations and the Government of Sudan to consider the adverse implications of 
climate change, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes 
in Darfur, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these 






PP: Recalling its Presidential statement S/PRST/2011/15, recognising the adverse effects of climate change, 
ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through 
drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasising the need for adequate risk 






The Security Council expresses its concern for increased tensions between pastoralists and farmers in the 
region driven by competition for natural resources, rapid population growth, weak governance, pressures 
related to climate and ecological factors, and the circulation of small arms and light weapons
The Security Council expresses concern over the overall humanitarian situation in the region, characterized 
by…adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters and epidemics, which contribute 
to high levels of structural, chronic and acute vulnerability in the region and continue to affect populations, and 
call for significant humanitarian and development action as well as the disbursement of previously pledged 
funds
The Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural 
disasters among other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, including through drought, 
desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, continues to stress the need for long-term strategies by 
governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments to support stabilization and build resilience, 





The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural 
disasters among other factors on the stability of the Central Africa Region, including through drought, 
desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, continues to stress the need for long-term strategies by 
governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilisation and build resilience, 





PP: Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the stability of the Central African Region, including through drought, desertification, land 
degradation, and food insecurity, and stressing the need for adequate risk assessment by the United Nations 
relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African Region and the 
United Nations to support stabilization and build resilience
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PP: Noting that Africa still faces enormous challenges, including: governance deficits, economic difficulties, 
high rates of unemployment, the mismanagement of ethnic diversity, competition over power and resources, 
state fragility and weak state institutions, ungoverned spaces which leave room for illegal activities, the 
continued flow of weapons into the continent and their illicit circulation, mercenary activity, insurgencies 
and rebellions, inadequate border monitoring and control that facilitates transnational organized crime, illicit 
exploitation of natural resources, continued crisis that precipitate irregular migration, corruption, illicit financial 
flows which facilitate funding for illegal activities, climate change and natural disasters, and slow processes in 
the ratification of AU instruments and policies
OP 18: Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the stability of a number of AU Member States, including through drought, desertification, 
land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessment and risk 





PP: Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters among other 
factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food 
insecurity, and emphasising the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by 
governments and the United Nations relating to these factors, and recalling its Presidential statement S/
PRST/2011/15
OP 21: Requests the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States 
to consider the adverse implications of climate change, other ecological changes and natural disasters, 
among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk 
management strategies relating to these factors and further requests the Secretary-General to provide 





PP: Emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and the 






PP: Emphasizing the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies, by the government 
of Mali and the United Nations, of ecological changes, natural disasters, drought, desertification, land 







The Security Council welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review regarding 
the scope of UNOWAS’ mandate and activities, stresses the need for its independent nature and invites 
the Secretary-General to present to the Council its recommendations as well as his observations on these 
recommendations, including on potential areas of improvement or new or refocused priorities, including 
on Counter Terrorism, effects of climate change on security, intercommunal violence as part of a broad 
prevention and sustaining peace agenda, and present these by 15 November 2019, in order to usefully inform 
the Council’s discussions on the renewal of the Mission’s mandate which will expire on 31 December 2019
The Security Council welcomes the study concluded by UNOWAS on conflicts between pastoralists and 
farmers in the region, which concludes that tensions are being driven by competition for natural resources, 
rapid population growth, weak governance, pressures related to climate and ecological factors, and the 
circulation of small arms and light weapons. It encourages ECOWAS and its Member States, with the support 
of UNOWAS, to address these challenges in a coordinated and holistic manner. The Security Council further 
expresses its deep concern about the intensification of intercommunal violence in Central Mali and Burkina 
Faso, and reiterates that stabilisation of the situation and protection of civilians in this region requires a 
fully integrated response, led by the governments of those countries, with the support of UNOWAS and 
the international community, and encompassing simultaneous pursuit of progress on security, governance, 
humanitarian assistance and development, reconciliation, as well as protection and promotion of human rights
The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural 
disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among other 
factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-term 
strategies, based on risk assessments, by governments and the United Nations, to support stabilisation and 





The Council further encourages UNOCA to take into consideration climate change, ecological changes and 
natural disasters among other factors affecting the stability of the Central African Region, including through 
drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, continues to stress the need for long-term 
strategies by governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilisation and 
build resilience, and further requests that such information be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its 
activities
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MINUSCA S/RES/2499 
15 November 2019
PP: Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, including through drought, desertification, land 
degradation, food insecurity, and energy access, and stressing the need for adequate risk assessment by the 
United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African 
region and the United Nations to support stabilisation and build resilience
MONUSCO S/RES/2502 
19 December 2019
PP:  Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, and lack of 
energy access, among other factors, on the stability of the DRC, including through increasingly frequent 
and extreme weather phenomena, flooding, forest fires, erratic precipitation and food insecurity, welcoming 
the leadership of the DRC in the development of national strategies to address these issues and in the 
preservation of the Congo basin forest
UNOWAS 
(West Africa)
S/2020/85 (the letter 
to renew the mandate 
from 1/2/2020 to 
31/1/2023)
31 January 2020
Function 2.4 Take into consideration the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological 
changes and natural disasters, among other factors, including by assisting the governments of the region and 






The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes 
and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among 
other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-
term strategies, based on risk assessments, by governments and the United Nations, to support stabilisation 





PP: Emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and the 
UN, of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, energy access, and other factors on the 
stability of Somalia
UNITAMS (Sudan) S/RES/2524 
3 June 2020
PP: Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the stability of Sudan, particularly Darfur, and stressing the need for adequate risk 
assessment and risk management strategies by the Government of Sudan and the United Nations relating to 
these factors to support stabilisation and build resilience
MINUSMA (Mali) S/RES/2531 
29 June 2020
PP: Emphasizing the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies, by the Government 
of Mali and the United Nations, of ecological changes, natural disasters, drought, desertification, land 






The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes 
and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among 
other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-
term strategies, based on risk assessments, by governments and the United Nations, to support stabilisation 
and build resilience and encourages UNOWAS to continue to integrate this information in its activities
UNSOM (Somalia) S/RES/2540
28 August 2020
PP: Further recognising the adverse effects of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, 
among other factors, on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation 
and food insecurity, and recalling its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15
OP 13: Requests the United Nations, the FGS and the FMS to consider the adverse implications of 
climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in 
Somalia, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors, 
and requests the Secretary-General to provide an update in mandated reporting as appropriate
MINUSCA (CAR) S/RES/2552 
12 November 2020
PP: Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, including through drought, desertification, land 
degradation, food insecurity, and energy access, and stressing the need for adequate risk assessment by the 
United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African 
region and the United Nations to support stabilisation and build resilience
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MONUSCO (DRC) S/RES/2556 
18 December 2020
PP: Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, and lack of 
energy access, among other factors, on the stability of the DRC, including through increasingly frequent 
and extreme weather phenomena, flooding, forest fires, erratic precipitation and food insecurity, welcoming 
the leadership of the DRC in the development of national strategies to address these issues and in the 
preservation of the Congo basin forest
UNFICYP (Cyprus) S/RES/2561 
29 January 2021
PP: Recognising that effective contact and communication between the sides enhances the prospects for 
settlement and is in the interests of all Cypriots, and helps to address island-wide matters, including health, 





The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural 
disasters, including through drought, desertification, and land degradation, as well as their impacts on food 
security, among other factors, on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the 
need for long-term strategies, based on comprehensive risk assessments, by governments and the United 
Nations, to support stabilisation and build resilience and encourages UNOWAS to continue to integrate this 





PP: Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among 
other factors, on the humanitarian situation and stability in South Sudan, and emphasizing the need for 
comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies by the GoSS and the UN to inform 
programs relating to these factors
AMISOM (Somalia) S/RES/2568 
12 March 2021
PP: Emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and 
the United Nations, of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters and other factors on the 
stability of Somalia




The Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural 
disasters, among other factors, on the stability of a number of African States, including through drought, 
desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessment 
and risk management strategies by the respective governments and the United Nations relating to these 
factors
UNAMI (Iraq) S/RES/2576 
27 May 2021
PP: Recognizing that the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among 
other factors, can contribute to desertification and drought, the humanitarian situation and stability in Iraq, and 
emphasizing the need for comprehensive risk assessments by the Government of Iraq with the support of the 
United Nations, upon the request of the Government of Iraq, to take meaningful actions to adapt to or mitigate 
challenges posed by climate change and ecological change
OP. 4 (b)(iv): the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on issues of 
border security, energy, trade, environment, water, adverse impacts of climate change, infrastructure, public 
health, and refugees
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and Security
LETTERS
S/2007/186 (5 April 2007) was a concept note for an open debate on 
energy, security and climate.
S/2007/334 (6 June 2007) was a concept note on an open debate on 
natural resources and conflict.
S/2011/408 (1 July 2011) was a concept note for an open debate on the 
impact of climate change.
S/2011/698 (8 November 2011) was a concept note for a briefing on new 
challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention 
including pandemics, climate change, and transnational organised crime.
S/2013/334 (6 June 2013) was a concept note for an open debate on 
conflict prevention and natural resources.
S/2015/543 (15 July 2015) was a concept note for an open debate on 
peace and security challenges facing Small Island Developing States.
S/2016/969 (14 November 2016) was a concept note for an open debate 
on water and peace and security.
S/2017/1016 (1 December 2017) was a concept note for an open debate 
complex contemporary challenges to international peace and security. 
S/2018/901 (9 October 2018) was a concept note for a briefing on main-
tenance of international peace and security: root causes of conflict — 
the role of natural resources.
S/2019/1 (2 January 2019) was a concept note for an open debate on the 
impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security. 
S/2020/882 (1 September 2020) was a concept note for a high-level 
open debate on the humanitarian effects of environmental degradation 
and peace and security.
S/2020/1064 (30 October 2020) was a concept note for an open 
debate on peacebuilding and sustaining peace: contemporary drivers of 
conflict and insecurity. 
S/2021/155 (17 February 2021) a concept note for a high-level open 
debate on maintenance of international peace and security: climate and 
security.
MEETING RECORDS
S/PV.5663 (17 April 2007) and S/PV.5663 Resumption I was an open 
debate on the relationship between energy, security and climate. 
S/PV.5705 (25 June 2007) was an open debate on natural resources 
and conflict. 
S/PV.6587 (20 July 2011) and S/PV.6587 Resumption I was an open 
debate on the impact of climate change.
S/PV.6668 (23 November 2011) was a briefing by Yury Fedotov, Execu-
tive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; António 
Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and Margaret 
Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization on new chal-
lenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention.
S/PV.6982 (19 June 2013) was an open debate on conflict prevention 
and natural resources.
S/PV.7499 (30 July 2015) was an open debate on maintenance of inter-
national peace and security Peace and security challenges facing Small 
Island Developing States.
S/PV.7699 (26 May 2016) was a briefing by Mohamed Ibn Chambas, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United 
Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; Jean-Paul Laborde, Execu-
tive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate 
and Assistant Secretary-General; Monique Barbut, Executive Secretary 
of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification; and Hindou 
Oumarou Ibrahim, Coordinator of the Association des femmes peules 
autochtones du Tchadon; Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representa-
tive for Mali and the Sahel, and Angel Losada, European Union Special 
Representative for the Sahel, on peace and security in Africa and the 
challenges in the Sahel region.
S/PV.7818 (22 November 2016) was an open debate on water, peace 
and security. 
S/PV.7959 (6 June 2017) was a briefing by Secretary-General António 
Guterres.
S/PV.8144 (20 December 2017) was an open debate on complex con-
temporary challenges to international peace and security.
S/PV.8307 (11 July 2018) was a debate on understanding and addressing 
climate-related security risks. 
S/PV.8372 (16 October 2018) was a briefing by the Secretary-General 
António Guterres on the root causes of conflict — the role of natural 
resources. 
S/PV.8451 (25 January 2019) was an open debate on the impacts of 
climate-related disasters on international peace and security.
S/PV.8748 (14 July 2020) was an open debate on climate change and 
security.  
S/2020/929 (21 September 2020) was a letter transmitting briefings 
from the high-level open debate (VTC) on the humanitarian effects of 
environmental degradation and peace and security, convened 17 Sep-
tember 2020
S/2020/1090 (5 November 2020) was a letter transmitting briefings 
from an open debate (VTC) on peacebuilding and sustaining peace: con-
temporary drivers of conflict and insecurity, convened 3 November 2020.
S/2021/198 (25 February 2021) was a letter transmitting briefings from 
an open debate (VTC) on climate and security, convened 23 February 
2021. 
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